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ABSTRACT
In contrast to initial expectations, a recent literature has identified coalition formation as
being almost as common in presidential systems as in parliamentary systems. However, few
studies have analyzed the dynamics of coalition governments in presidential democracies. In
this dissertation, I address these dynamics, which include government formation, government
breakdown, and policy monitoring between coalition partners. Three questions are answered
in this dissertation: What explains the variation in the advantage of the president’s party
with regards to the allocation of ministerial posts? Why and when do presidential coalition
members monitor policies being implemented by their partners? Under what conditions are
cabinet coalition terminations more likely to occur in presidential systems? My answers to
these questions provide important insights into the fundamental differences between presi-
dential and parliamentary forms of government.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Coalition formation, monitoring, and termination have been central subjects of interest
to parliamentary studies for decades.1 Recently, scholars have identified coalition forma-
tion as being almost as common in presidential systems as in parliamentary systems (De-
heza, 1998; Lanzaro, 2001; Cheibub, 2007; Figueiredo, Salles, and Vieira, 2009; Camerlo and
Martínez-Gallardo, 2018; Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power, 2018). In fact, studies compar-
ing parliamentary and presidential systems have suggested that the incentives for coalition
formation are similar in both systems of government (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Cheibub,
Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub and Limongi, 2011; Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg,
2014). However, we still do not understand when and why we should expect similarities and
differences in coalition management (i.e., coalition formation, monitoring, and termination)
across presidential and parliamentary democracies. To understand these differences and for a
more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of coalition formation, monitoring, and
termination in presidential democracies, we must carefully consider the unique institutional
characteristics between presidential and parliamentary systems of government.
Although incentives for coalition formation are shared by both parliamentary and pres-
idential systems, and empirically, coalitions are common in presidential democracies, these
are insufficient facts to understand the dynamics and how coalitions work in both parliamen-
tary and presidential governments. Oddly enough, In spite of a vast literature examining the
consequences of coalition governments in presidential systems, very few studies have explored
the functioning (or management) of coalition governments in these systems in comparison
1The parliamentary literature on these topics is extensive and includes, among others, De Swaan (1973);
Browne and Frendreis (1980); Robertson (1983a,b, 1984); Strøm et al. (1988); Strøm, Budge, and Laver
(1994); Laver and Schofield (1990); Laver and Shepsle (1990); King et al. (1990); Warwick (1992, 1994);
Martin and Stevenson (2001); Warwick and Druckman (2001, 2006); Thies (2001); Lupia and Strøm (1995a);
Müller and Strøm (2003); Strøm, Müller, and Bergman (2008); Indridason and Kam (2008); Bäck, Debus,
and Dumont (2011); Martin and Vanberg (2004); Strøm, Müller, and Smith (2010); Lipsmeyer and Pierce
(2011); Martin and Vanberg (2011); Carroll and Cox (2012); Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason (2013); Bergman,
Ersson, and Hellström (2015); Cutler et al. (2015); Blondel and Müller-Rommel (2016); Bucur (2016); Döring
and Manow (2017).
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to parliamentary democracies. This is the main contribution of my research: To understand
coalition management in multiparty presidential systems in comparison to parliamentary
systems. According to the theories suggested in my dissertation, I expect the context and
institutional specificities of presidential democracies to have important effects on cabinet
formation, monitoring and termination.
Three questions are answered in this dissertation: What can explain the variation in
the advantage of the president’s party with regards to the allocation of ministerial posts
during the government formation? Why and when do presidential cabinet members monitor
the policies being implemented by coalition partners? Under what conditions are cabinet
coalition terminations more likely to occur in presidential systems?
To answer these questions, I propose theories in which I adapt elements from the ex-
tensive literature on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies to the context and
specificities of presidential democracies. Presidential systems have institutional features that
are absent in parliamentary systems, and as these features may affect coalition management,
they should not be overlooked: 1. Presidents have constitutional powers to form and reshuf-
fle the government’s cabinet; 2. Presidents are always the formateur in the government
formation process and; 3. Due to the absence of no-confidence procedures, presidents have
constitutionally fixed-terms, and, other than in exceptional cases, presidents remain in power
even under adverse legislative conditions and coalition breakdown.
1.1 Chapters Outline
The chapters of this dissertation are organized to address the before-mentioned research
questions on coalition management in multiparty presidential systems. There is evidence in
parliamentary systems that ministerial posts (portfolios) are allocated roughly in proportion
to the number of seats that each government party brings to the coalition. Studies of portfo-
lio allocation in presidential multiparty democracies, however, have found that presidential
parties consistently receive more portfolios than other coalition members. The expectation
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that the president’s party will receive a higher allocation of portfolios is supported by empir-
ical evidence, and defined as the “formateur ’s advantage.” However, as I explain in the first
chapter of my dissertation, despite the president’s party typically receiving more portfolios
than predicted by their seat share contribution, a significant variation in the size of the for-
mateur ’s advantage is observed. In this chapter, I develop a theory to explain when a greater
formateur ’s advantage can be expected within presidential democracies. I argue that there
is a trade-off between the presidents’ desire to control as many portfolios as possible, and
their desire to legislate and influence policy. In fact, my results reveal that when presidents
have greater institutionally-granted powers to influence the policy agenda in the legislature,
a greater formateur ’s advantage is observed.
A recent literature on parliamentary systems also shows that coalition members keep
tabs on their partners to prevent ministerial policy drift. Building on this literature, in the
second chapter of my dissertation I explore intra-coalition politics in presidential democ-
racies. By analyzing more than 20,000 information requests made between 1995 and 2014
by members of the Brazilian Congress to individual ministers, I studied the flow of policy
monitoring between coalition partners. I found that coalition partners participate in more
policy monitoring when the ideological distance between them is greater. Thus, similar to
parliamentary systems, coalition partners in presidential democracies have an incentive and
do keep tabs on one another. I also theorize that certain institutional features of presiden-
tial systems—particularly the capacity of the president to fire a minister without fear of a
government breakdown—lead to greater policy monitoring initiatives from junior partners
as compared to the president’s party.
In the third chapter, I research what circumstances lead to presidential coalition termi-
nation. One of the early beliefs about coalitions in presidential systems was that they would
form only rarely, and that when they formed, they would be erratic and short-lived. Based
on the exclusive powers of the president to form and reshuffle cabinets and the president’s
central position within coalition governments, I argue that economic indicators and the pub-
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lic’s evaluation of the president’s performance to be crucial factors in predicting coalition
termination. By examining 82 cabinets from 1978 to 2007 in 10 Latin American democracies,
I show that presidential coalitions are more than ephemeral phenomena. They terminate
for political and economic reasons, similar to those that can lead to parliamentary coalition
termination. The difference between the two systems of government with regards to coalition
termination is one of degree.
In the last chapter, I briefly summarize and discuss the implications of the findings of
this dissertation. These findings further our understanding of coalition governments in pres-
idential democracies, enhance our understanding of the relationship between the executive
and legislature in parliamentary and presidential systems, and provide important insights
into the fundamental differences between these forms of government. In this chapter, I also
discuss the several avenues opened by this dissertation for future research in the topic of
coalition governments in presidential systems.
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2. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE INTERDEPENDENCE:
THE ALLOCATION OF PORTFOLIOS TO PRESIDENTIAL PARTIES
2.1 Introduction
The standard view in comparative politics sees the executive as dependent upon the
legislature in parliamentary systems, but independent from the legislature in presidential
systems. In this study, I argue for a more nuanced comparison between these systems
of government. While it is true that confidence procedures make prime ministers more
dependent upon the legislature than presidents, the need for all executives to make policies
means that all presidents are dependent upon the legislature to some degree. I theorize that
the degree of presidential dependence on the legislature depends on institutional provisions
that allow some presidents greater leeway in making policies. I then show that the variation in
the dependence of the president on the legislature to make and enact policies has implications
on how governments are formed and how they perform in presidential democracies.
In all systems of government, the chief executive wants to: 1. survive, and; 2. legislate.
In parliamentary systems, in order to survive, the chief executive depends on a legislative
majority in the parliament. To legislate, the chief executive depends on the support of a
majority in the legislature, and a common approach to achieve this support is by build-
ing a majority coalition government. Therefore, in parliamentary systems dependence is
introduced in two ways.
In presidential systems, the chief executive does not depend on a legislative majority to
survive. Other than in exceptional cases, presidents will remain in power even under adverse
legislative conditions. Thus, in presidential systems dependence enters in one way only, i.e.,
the president depends on the legislature to legislate (e.g., needing legislative majorities to
approve her policy agenda). In this study, I show that, because this dependence on the
legislature varies within presidential democracies, this helps explain the variation in the
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allocation of portfolios to presidential parties.
Using data from 30 countries, I show that the distribution of portfolios occurs in a more
proportional fashion to the share of legislative seats the members of the coalition contribute
to the government in parliamentary democracies than in presidential democracies. I also
show that a formateur’s advantage—i.e., a bonus in the share of ministerial posts controlled
by the formateur’s party—is less prevalent in parliamentary democracies. Within a sample
of presidential systems, I then demonstrate that if the president is more dependent upon
the legislature to make and enact policies, the balance of power in presidential cabinets
is more likely to reflect the balance of power in the legislature, similar to what we see in
parliamentary democracies. Otherwise, if the president is less dependent upon the legislature
to make and enact policies, the balance of power in presidential cabinets is more likely to
reflect a formateur’s advantage.
In the sections that follow, I begin by reviewing the literature on portfolio allocation
in parliamentary and presidential systems of government. I then illustrate the differences
we may see in the formateur’s advantage between these two systems. I then develop my
theoretical argument to explain the variance in the allocation of portfolios to presidential
parties within presidential democracies. After introducing the dataset, I estimate a series
of models to test the empirical implications of my theory, and offer an interpretation of the
results. In the last section, I discuss my findings and suggest ideas for future research.
2.2 Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
It is frequently the case in multiparty systems—i.e., systems with more than two effective
political parties—that no single party holds an absolute majority of seats in the national
legislature. This circumstance usually compels heads of government to form a coalition in
order to govern effectively. This inevitably involves horse trading between elites to determine
how the government will be formed and which ministerial posts (portfolios) will be allocated
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to those parties that comprise the coalition.1
Heads of government distribute ministerial portfolios across parties in exchange for leg-
islative support. Legislative parties value portfolios, either because of their intrinsic benefits
(e.g., access to office perks and patronage) or because portfolios provide the opportunity to
shape the policy agenda of the government.
In the literature on parliamentary governments, much of the debate on portfolio allocation
has focused on Gamson’s idea (1961, p. 376) that, “any participant will expect others to
demand from a coalition a share of the payoff that is proportional to the amount of resources
which they contribute to a coalition.” The operationalization of these resources as seat share
contribution to the coalition was later developed by Browne and Franklin (1973, p. 457), who
stated that “the percentage share of ministries received by a party participating in a governing
coalition and the percentage share of that party’s coalition seats will be proportional on a
one-to-one basis.”
Several tests on parliamentary democracies have found a high correlation between party
seat share and portfolio share. These studies conclude that governing parties tend to receive
portfolio payoffs in proportion to the share of legislative seats they contribute to the coalition
(Browne and Franklin, 1973; Browne and Frendreis, 1980; Schofield and Laver, 1985; Laver
and Schofield, 1990; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Warwick and Druckman, 2001, 2006; Laver,
de Marchi, and Mutlu, 2011; Bassi, 2013; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason, 2013; Bergman,
Ersson, and Hellström, 2015).2 The empirical regularity of a proportional allocation of
portfolios in parliamentary systems has been labeled as “Gamson’s Law of Proportionality”
(Warwick and Druckman, 2001).
1The use of the term coalition in this study refers to government coalition and not legislative coali-
tion. A government coalition is composed of the formateur’s political party—i.e., the party that forms the
government—and all parties that accept the ministerial posts offered by the formateur, whether these parties
support the government in the legislature or not.
2The positive relationship between the share of legislative seats a governing party contributes to the
coalition and its share of portfolios is not perfect. Browne and Franklin (1973, p. 460) reveal a deviation
from the one-to-one proportionality in which small parties seem to receive more portfolios than we would
expect based on their seat share contribution. More recent studies on parliamentary systems also present
evidence that contradicts Gamson’s Law (Ansolabehere et al., 2005; Golder and Thomas, 2014; Indridason,
2015).
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Mechanisms have been suggested for the empirical support of Gamson’s Law. Verzichelli
(2008) suggests that while parties in favorable bargaining positions may accept a “fair”
division of portfolios, those in a disadvantaged position may prefer to remain out of the gov-
ernment than accept an “unfair” offer. Carroll and Cox (2007) argue that coalitions based
on pre-election alliances are more prone to exhibit proportionality in portfolio allocation.
Bäck, Meier, and Persson (2009) argue that proportional allocation serves as a focal point
(Schelling, 1981), helping parties to reduce bargaining costs and selecting equilibria in un-
certain contexts where multiple equilibria (e.g., numerous coalitions) exist. Bassi (2013)
suggests that the proportionality depends on parties’ legislative sizes and preferences with
regard to cabinet portfolios. Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason (2013) argue that more uncertain
and complex bargaining situations often lead to a more proportional executive cabinet, as
a result of parties encountering greater obstacles that prevent or hinder them from taking
advantage of their bargaining position.
Recent studies highlight defining institutional features of parliamentary systems as the
central explanation for the proportionality of portfolio allocation. Scholars have argued
that chief executives face strong incentives to appoint proportional cabinets only when they
depend on legislative confidence (Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Golder and Thomas,
2014; Indridason, 2015).
In parliamentary systems, the formateur most often comes from the largest party in
the legislature and generally becomes the new head of government (i.e., prime minister) if
the formation succeeds. Because the prime minister depends on legislative parties for her
government’s survival, the prime minister cannot afford to ignore the preferences of the
parties that will comprise the government (Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010). Ignoring
these preferences could result in a legislative majority removing the government from office
by passing a vote of no confidence. If this happens, neither the formateur’s party nor the
parties that comprise the new legislative majority can be confident of a greater seat share in
the next government formation attempt. Therefore, the presence of the vote of no confidence
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in parliamentary systems deters the formateur from forming a cabinet too disproportional
in her party’s favor (Golder and Thomas, 2014; Indridason, 2015).
Compared to the vast literature on parliamentary systems, our understanding of whether
portfolio allocation follows any degree of proportionality among the parties that compose
the government in presidential systems is still underdeveloped. The scarcity of such studies
on presidential systems reflects the fact that scholars have only recently identified coali-
tion formation as being almost as common in presidential systems as in parliamentary sys-
tems (Deheza, 1998; Lanzaro, 2001; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007;
Figueiredo, Salles, and Vieira, 2009; Cheibub and Limongi, 2011).
In fact, studies comparing parliamentary and presidential systems have suggested that
the incentives for coalition formation are similar in both systems of government—i.e., for
increasing the legislative strength of the president’s party and for increasing the policy influ-
ence of coalition members (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh,
2004; Cheibub and Limongi, 2011; Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg, 2014). However, we still
do not understand when and why we should expect similarities and differences in coalition
formation across presidential and parliamentary democracies.
Parliamentary and presidential systems have different institutional features that must be
carefully considered for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of coalition
formation. First, in presidential systems presidents are always the formateur in the govern-
ment formation process (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011;
Silva, 2016). As a consequence, under presidential systems, every government coalition must
include the party of the president (Cheibub, 2007).
Second, because the government does not rely on the vote of confidence in presidential
systems, presidents can change the composition of their cabinets at their discretion during
their term in office, without fear of early elections. Having constitutionally-fixed terms
ensures that, other than in exceptional cases, presidents will remain in power even under
adverse legislative conditions (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993; Altman, 2000b;
9
Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007).
From the absence of the vote of no confidence in presidential systems, formateur parties
are not reliant on their coalition partners for their continued survival in office. As a result,
scholars suggest that formateurs in presidential systems will value the contribution of the
legislatives seats of their coalition partners to the government less than would be the case in
parliamentary systems (Ariotti and Golder, 2018). This means that non-formateur parties
cannot expect the offers they receive to be as generous from presidential formateurs as from
prime ministerial formateurs. It follows that formateur parties should receive a higher share
of portfolios, relative to their legislative size, in presidential systems than in parliamentary
systems (Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Indridason, 2015).
In sum, institutional features of the presidential system should allow presidents to take
advantage of their privileged bargaining position in the process of government formation.
As a consequence, while we should expect a proportional distribution of portfolios in parlia-
mentary systems, in presidential systems we should observe a disproportional distribution
to the benefit of the formateur’s party.
To understand the allocation of portfolios in parliamentary systems, it might be sufficient
to estimate Gamson’s Law as:
portfolio share = f(seat share contribution)
In comparison to parliamentary systems, however, it is expected that the formateur’s
party in presidential systems receives more portfolios than predicted by its seat share contri-
bution. In this case, we would need to add the formateur’s status of presidential parties as a
factor to explain the distribution of portfolios in presidential systems. The current literature
already reveals a bonus in the portfolio share for the president’s party on average (Altman,
2000b; Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Indridason, 2015; Ariotti and Golder, 2018). Yet,
in the next section I show that there is more variation in the share of portfolios controlled
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by presidential parties than the literature acknowledges.
2.3 The Variation in the Allocation of Porfolios to Presidential Parties
The proportional distribution of ministerial portfolios, known as Gamson’s Law (1961),
suggests that coalition parties should receive shares of portfolios proportional to the share
of legislative seats they contribute to the coalition. The equation to test Gamson’s Law can
be expressed as:
pi = α + βsi + ui
Where pi is the share of portfolios party i receives from the total of available portfolios (i.e.,
the number of cabinet portfolios controlled by party i divided by the total number of available
portfolios in the cabinet); si is the share of legislative seats governing party i contributes to
the coalition when the cabinet is appointed (i.e., the number of legislative seats party i brings
to the coalition divided by the total number of legislative seats controlled by the coalition);
ui is the error term, and; α and β are parameters to be estimated. A perfect proportionality
in portfolio allocation—Gamson’s Law—implies that, from the above equation, β should
equal one, while α should be zero.
The standard method of testing Gamson’s Law is to conduct an ordinary least squares re-
gression (OLS) of the share of portfolios they control (their portfolio share) on the legislative
seat share that governing parties contribute to the coalition (their seat share contribution).
Table 2.1 presents the relationship between these variables in parliamentary and presidential
systems of government. The expectations are 1. the translation of seat share contribution
into portfolio share should occur in a more proportional fashion in parliamentary systems
than in presidential systems, and; 2. on average, the formateur’s advantage should be greater
in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems.
In Model 1 of Table 2.1, Gamson’s Law is tested across parliamentary democracies using
Warwick and Druckman’s (2006) data, comprising 807 observations at the governing party
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Table 2.1: Testing Gamson’s Law and the Formateur ’s Advantage in Parliamentary and
Presidential Systems
Gamson’s Law Formateur Advantage
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Parliamentary) (Presidential) (Parliamentary) (Presidential)
Seat Share Contribution (%) 0.843∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.028) (0.013) (0.027)
Formateur 0.022∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.014)
Intercept 0.052∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.009)
N 807 596 807 596
R2 0.91 0.36 0.91 0.55
RootMSE 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.14
Dependent variable: Portfolio Share (%).
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The hypotheses tests for the Intercept and Formateur are:
Null hypothesis: α = 0; Alternative hypothesis: α 6= 0.
The hypotheses tests for Seat Share Contribution are:
Null hypothesis: β = 1; Alternative hypothesis: β 6= 1.
level (i.e., the unit of analysis) from cabinets formed across 14 European countries from 1945
to 2000. In Model 2, Gamson’s Law is tested in presidential democracies using new data
at the governing party level as well from 13 presidential cabinets formed over more than 50
years (1959-2017), comprising 596 observations. Model 3 and Model 4 present the results
for testing the formateur’s advantage in parliamentary systems and presidential systems,
respectively.
As expected, the results from the Gamson’s Law models indicate that seat share con-
tribution is translated in portfolio share in a more proportional fashion in parliamentary
systems. A β = 0.84 in Model 1 and a β = 0.50 in Model 2, both statistically significant
at level 0.001, suggest that the link between an increase in seat share contribution and an
increase in portfolio share is weaker in presidential democracies. The models to test the for-
mateur’s advantage (Model 3 and Model 4) include a binary variable formateur, identifying
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the party that forms the government. While in parliamentary democracies the formateur
party seems to receive a small bonus in the allocation of portfolios (with a significant coef-
ficient equal to 0.02), the formateur in presidential systems tends to receive a much greater
bonus in the portfolio allocation process. On average, the formateur status seems to give the
formateur’s party a bonus in portfolio share ten times larger in presidential systems than in
parliamentary systems (compare Models 3 and 4).
It is noteworthy that seat share contribution accounts for much more of the variation of
portfolio share in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. Based on the results
presented in Table 2.1, Figures 2.1a and 2.1b depict this variation identifying the formateur’s
party.
Figure 2.1: Proportionality in Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
(a) Parliamentary Systems
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Each dot in Figures 2.1a and 2.1b represents a party that ended up in government, with
solid black dots identifying the formateur’s party. Observations above the 45-degree black
dashed line (representing Gamson’s Law) are parties that received more portfolios than
expected based on the number of legislative seats they contribute to the coalition, while
parties below the dashed line are parties that received less portfolios than expected based
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on their number of legislative seats. Observations located on the dashed line are parties
that received a proportional share of portfolios based on their seat share contribution to the
coalition.
An R2 of 0.36 in Model 2 of Table 2.1 (almost a third of the value of the R2 in Model
1) and the higher variation of the solid black dots identifying the formateur’s party above
and below the slope line in Figure 2.1b suggest that something else, besides seat share
contribution, could explain the variance in portfolio share. Adding the formateur status into
Model 2 of Table 2.1 increases the R2 to 0.55 (Model 4). Although a higher R2 is achieved,
there remains significant variance in the formateur advantage models to be explained.
In this study, I theorize that the extent to which the president controls the legislative
process is a crucial factor to understanding the variation in the allocation of portfolios to
presidential parties. While in parliamentary systems, the government usually exerts control
over legislation, in presidential systems, the policy-making powers of the president can vary
significantly (Cheibub, 2007). There is a range, from institutionally-weak presidents who
do not hold any active policy-making powers, to institutionally-strong presidents who essen-
tially dominate the agenda and the time of the legislative process.
2.4 Executive-Legislative Interdependence
In multiparty presidential systems, presidents without legislative majorities have incen-
tives to form a coalition, distributing portfolios in exchange for legislative support (Cheibub
and Limongi, 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub, Elkins,
and Ginsburg, 2014). Given that presidents value both office and policy, this circumstance
signals a clear trade-off for the president’s party. Either the president’s party has maximum
control of resources and benefits of office (e.g., controlling all portfolios), or the president’s
party influences the policy agenda, exchanging some portfolios to other legislative parties
for legislative support. In an extreme situation, the maximum disproportionality in the al-
location of portfolios in presidential systems would occur if the president could control all
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Figure 2.2: Constraints in Coalition Formation in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
a. Parliamentary Systems
Formateur
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Coalition
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Constraint
Legislative
Constraint
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Formateur
(President)
Coalition
Formation
Legislative
Constraint
portfolios available in the executive cabinet.3 However, as a recent literature has shown
(Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011; Cheibub and Limongi, 2011; Magar and Moraes, 2012; Zucco,
2013; Freitas, 2016b; Toro-Maureira and Hurtado, 2016; Freitas, 2016a; Araújo, Freitas, and
Vieira, 2018), presidents also care about policy and regret being penalized for controlling all
portfolios and being unable to pass their policy agenda.4
In both parliamentary and presidential forms of government, chief executives seek to en-
dure in office (and to reap the political benefits that come from controlling ministries), and
to legislate (i.e., to influence the policy agenda). As depicted in Figure 2.2, in parliamentary
systems coalition formation by the formateur has a direct effect on survival, through the
3This situation is not fully accurate, because if the president keeps all portfolios to herself it would
mean that a coalition was not formed. But the example helps as a thought experiment to understand the
implications of a maximum disproportionality.
4It is also assumed that the greater the number of portfolios held by a party i, the greater the influence
of party i on the executive’s policy agenda. In addition, a policy adopted within a portfolio controlled by
party i is likely to be closer to party i’s ideal point than it would be, had party i not been part of the cabinet
coalition.
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no-confidence procedure (no-confidence constraint), and a direct effect on policy through
governing parties’ commitment to vote for the agenda of the government (legislative con-
straint). In presidential systems, however, coalition formation can affect policy but not the
survival of the government (at least not directly).
In a parliamentary system, the failure of a formateur to form a coalition and obtain a
legislative majority in parliamentary democracies results either in an early election, a new
round of bargaining, or a caretaker government.5 Therefore, there is uncertainty regarding
whether the parties that do not accept the formateur’s offer can benefit in the next attempt
to form a coalition government.
There is also uncertainty in presidential systems when parties do not accept the presi-
dent’s offer. The difference is in the degree of uncertainty for the formateur’s party. If a
coalition offer made by the president is rejected, then either another coalition attempt is
initiated, or maybe no coalition will be formed at all, resulting in a single-party cabinet
controlled by the president’s party. These different scenarios yield different utilities to the
president and she does not know in advance what she will get. Therefore, the difference be-
tween presidential and parliamentary systems is that there is an additional uncertainty for
prime ministers, i.e., they might get removed from power due to the no-confidence constraint
(see Figure 2.2). They might lose their legislative seats in the next election, or they might
wind up in the opposition.
Amorim Neto and Samuels (2010), Indridason (2015), and Ariotti and Golder (2018)
have argued that this institutional difference (i.e., the absence of a no-confidence procedure
in presidential systems) is crucial for understanding why we do not see the same pattern in
the allocation of portfolios between parliamentary and presidential democracies. But, as I
discuss below, differences within presidential systems must be used to explain the substantial
variation in the allocation of portfolios to presidential parties.
5Strøm (1990) shows that minority governments also emerge in parliamentary systems with many institu-
tional opportunities for the opposition to influence policy. Instead of seeing these governments as a product
of bargaining failures, minority governments can be considered a result of rational and informed actors.
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Presidents can have a greater or lesser influence on policy, depending on how dependent
they are on the legislature to make and enact policies. This dependence relies on presidents’
policy-making powers granted by constitutions. These powers affect the bargaining strategy
between the president and the legislature, which, consequently, affects the composition of
cabinets.
In sum, my theory is that the bargaining process between the president and the legislature
around a coalition formation depends on institutional arrangements that define the balance
of power between the president and legislative parties and their abilities to influence the
policy agenda.
The greater the president’s policy-making powers, the less dependent the president is on
the legislature to legislate, and the greater the president’s ability to shape the legislative
agenda. Consequently, this leads to a greater presidential control over resources and benefits
of office, allowing presidents to control a higher share of portfolios than the share of legisla-
tive seats her party contributes to the coalition.
2.4.1 President’s Policy-Making Powers
Presidential systems are usually defined according to the concept developed by Shugart
and Carey (1992, p. 19-20):
1. The chief executive is elected by popular vote or by a body that was itself popularly
elected;
2. The terms of the chief executive and the assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on
mutual confidence;
3. The chief executive selects and removes the members of the cabinet, and;
4. The chief executive has some constitutionally-granted lawmaking authority such as
veto power.
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The first three items of Shugart and Carey’s definition highlight the independence of the
origin and the survival of the executive and the legislative powers that are present in all
definitions of presidential systems. The fourth item adds another defining feature to this
form of government, i.e., that the chief executive is endowed with policy-making powers.
These powers lead to the wide variation within presidential governments, as revealed by
Shugart and Carey (1992).
According to Shugart and Carey (1992), the president’s lawmaking authority alters pres-
idential incentives to seek legislative cooperation for the approval of the government’s policy
agenda. Presidents with low lawmaking authority would be forced to negotiate with the
legislature, because they know that without concessions they will not have their agenda
approved. Presidents with greater lawmaking authority, in turn, will seek to govern by cir-
cumventing the legislature due to their greater ability to unilaterally impose their agenda.
This view shaped the literature on presidents’ strategies to govern either by statute or by
their executive prerogatives (Jones, 1995; Tsebelis, 1995, 2002; Pereira, Power, and Rennó,
2005; Amorim Neto, 2006a,b; Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo, 2018).
Subsequent studies revealed the substantial influence that the legislature exerts on the
policy-making process in presidential systems, including in countries in which the president
holds strong lawmaking authority (such as Brazil and Chile). These studies highlight that
presidential policy-making powers should be taken as instruments to achieve inter-branch
cooperation (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999, 2000; Shugart and Haggard, 2001; Eaton, 2002;
Colomer and Negretto, 2003; Freitas, 2016a,b). Even the president’s prerogative to issue
decrees, considered one of the most-important powers in the hands of the president, has been
characterized by the impact it has on the preference of parliamentary majorities (Limongi
and Figueiredo, 1998; Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999, 2000; Carey and Shugart, 1998; Cox,
McCubbins, and Amorim Neto, 2003; Pereira, Power, and Rennó, 2005).
Presidential policy-making powers—such as decree powers, the president’s exclusive power
to introduce legislation in certain areas, veto powers, and urgency requests—shape the
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agenda-setting of the legislative branch. These powers increase the president’s ability to
determine which proposals will be the subject of the legislature’s consideration and when
they will be considered, shaping the options available to legislators. The ability to influence
legislative activities helps the president form a majority. In fact, the control exerted by
the president on the agenda of the legislative activities induces legislators to cooperate in
support of the government’s policy objectives (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000; Cheibub and
Limongi, 2011).
According to my theory, a greater share of portfolios controlled by presidential parties
should be observed in countries where, ceteris paribus, presidents have a greater opportunity
to influence the policy agenda in the legislature. The greater the policy-making powers of the
presidents, the less dependent they are on the legislature to legislate, and the less they will
relinquish control of portfolios. As a result, there will be a correlation between president’s
policy-making powers and the president’s party portfolio share. The empirical implication
to be tested in this study, then, is that the greater the president’s policy-making powers, the
greater the president’s party portfolio share.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The unit of analysis in this study is the governing party within the coalition, considered
yearly. A government coalition is composed of the formateur’s political party (which is always
the presidential party in presidential systems) and all parties that accept the ministerial posts
offered by the formateur. Hence, a governing party is defined according to whether a party
holds a cabinet membership—that is, if the party controls at least one portfolio.6
6Only coalition governments are included in the sample. Observations meeting either one or both of the
following conditions were dropped: 1. a political party holds at least one portfolio but does not hold a
legislative seat, and; 2. the president’s party does not hold portfolios in the executive cabinet. Only two
cases met these conditions in the dataset: the Panamanian governing party PRC under the Guillermo Endara
administration from 1993 to 1994, which held portfolios but not legislative seats, and; under Alvaro’s Uribe’s
independent Colombian presidency (i.e., the president was not affiliated with any Colombian political party)
between 2002 and 2009, holding neither legislative seats nor portfolios. Even including these cases, the results
are still consistent. Dropping these cases is justified by the aforementioned assumption that presidents form
a coalition by distributing portfolios in exchange for legislative support, and by the definition of a coalition
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The empirical analyses were conducted using the most comprehensive data collected to
date from 13 presidential multiparty democracies. The data comprise a total of 52 presiden-
tial administrations and 36 presidential parties spanning 58 years (1959–2017), consisting of
187 observations in total.7
2.5.1 Dependent Variable
President’s Portfolio Balance (PPB). This variable is the measurement for the balance of
the portfolio share controlled by the presidential party, as depicted in the following equation:
PPBfi =
(
pfi
tpi
)
−
(
sfi
tsi
)
Where pf is the number of portfolios the formateur’s party f controls, tp is the total number
of cabinet portfolios available, sf is the number of legislative seats the formateur’s party f
contributes to the coalition when the cabinet is appointed, and ts represents the number of
legislative seats held by the entire cabinet. The index i designates cabinet coalitions, and
goes from the first to the last coalition in the dataset.
PPB could range between -1 to +1. A positive value indicates that the president’s party
is receiving more portfolios relative to the share of legislative seats it contributes to the
coalition. A value of 0 indicates that the president’s party receives the same proportion of
portfolios as the share of legislative seats it contributes to the coalition. A negative value in
PPB means that the president’s party is receiving fewer portfolios than expected if perfect
proportionality between portfolio share and seat share contribution holds.8
The highest formateur’s advantage in the sample is the Panamanian presidential party
used in this study: all parties that hold at least one ministerial post within the presidential cabinet.
7The dataset was constructed by the author from several sources: Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo (2018);
Economist Intelligence Unit (2018); Keesing’s World News Archive (2018); Political Handbook of the World
Series (2018); Doyle and Elgie (2014); Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010); Cheibub (2007); Montero
(2009); Nohlen (2005); Sáez, Montero, and López (2005); and several national government websites.
8The distribution of the observed values of the PPB, including the minimum and maximum values in the
sample, can be seen in Appendix A.2.
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Panameñista (PP) under Juan Varelas’s administration from 2014 to 2017. The PP con-
trolled 79 percent of the portfolios available while only contributing 4 percent of the legislative
seats of the coalition. The Venezuelan cabinet formed by the president Raul Leoni in 1966
is an example of a perfect proportional allocation of portfolios, in which the presidential
party Acción Democrática (AC) controlled 66 percent of the portfolios available while con-
tributing 66 percent of the legislative seats of the coalition. In the cabinet formed by the El
Salvadorian president Mauricio Funes in 2013, the presidential party “Farabundo Martí Na-
tional Liberation Front” (FMNL) controlled only 17 percent of the portfolios available while
contributing an impressive 94 percent of the legislative seats of the coalition, representing a
case of a deficit in the portfolio share of the presidential party.9
2.5.2 Independent Variables
President’s Policy-Making Powers. Developed by Montero (2009), the legislative institu-
tional power index (IPIL) measures the institutional potential of the presidency to influence
the legislative activity vis-à-vis the legislature. This index is comprised of five additive di-
mensions of the legislative process: 1. the initiative stage; 2. the constitutive stage; 3. the
symmetry of the bicameral system; 4. the efficiency stage, and; 5. the decree power of the
president and her extraordinary legislative prerogatives.
The initiative stage includes three features: 1. the president’s exclusive power to intro-
duce legislation in certain areas; 2. the actors responsible for setting the legislative agenda of
the day, and; 3. the type of legislative majority needed to change the agenda of the day. The
greater the number of areas in which the president has exclusive initiative, and the smaller
the capacity of legislators to amend bill proposals, the greater the power of the president to
legislate.
The constitutive stage includes four features: 1. the election procedure for being a mem-
ber of legislative committees; 2. the presidential prerogatives to avoid bill passage by legisla-
9Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A.3.
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tive committees; 3. the power of legislative committees to considering bill proposals (e.g.,
non-binding opinion or delegation, and the inadmissibility or incompatibility of the bills),
and; 4. the capacity of the president to request urgency for her projects.
The symmetry of the bicameral system measures the powers of legislative chambers, and
how symmetrical are their powers. Building on Tsebelis (1995) and Tsebelis and Money
(1997), a president that needs to negotiate with two chambers to approve her policy agenda
has to deal with more veto players compared to a president that needs to negotiate with
only one chamber.
The efficiency stage measures presidential veto powers. Veto powers give the president
an opportunity to object to a bill (and hence the option to refuse to sign it), but they can be
counterbalanced by the legislature’s capacity to override presidential vetoes. With total veto
powers, presidents are presented with an all-or-nothing choice. With partial veto powers (or
line-item veto), in turn, presidents can choose to nullify only specific provisions of a bill,
changing or keeping the bill proposals closer to the president’s policy preferences.
These five dimensions are aggregated and standardized, giving the measure a range from
0 to 1. Values close to 1 indicate a greater influence of the president on the legislative
activities. Values close to 0 indicate a smaller influence of the president on the legislative
activities. This variable ranges in the sample from a minimum value of 0.26 (El Salvador)
to 0.71 (Chile), with an average of 0.53 and a standard deviation of 0.11.10
Three control variables are included in the regression model to account for possible con-
founders and to isolate the effect of president’s policy-making powers. First, I add a dummy
for electoral year based on the empirical expectation that as the next election approaches,
parties have fewer incentives to join or remain in the government, and therefore cabinet
termination should be more likely (Chasquetti, 1999; Altman, 2000b; Alemán and Tsebelis,
2011). According to Altman (2000b, p. 19), “whether a party remains in the executive
coalition is subject to the tyranny of the electoral calendar.” Although there are reasons to
10The distribution of the observed values of the President’s Policy-Making Powers, including the minimum
and maximum values in the sample, can be seen in Appendix A.3.
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believe that defection from the government will be less likely when the executive’s popularity
might benefit governing parties at the approaching elections (Martínez-Gallardo, 2012), im-
pending elections might also increase the incentives for incumbent presidents to renegotiate
the distribution of portfolios in order to form pre-electoral coalitions.
The effective number of parties (ENP) in the legislative branch, as developed by Laakso
and Taagepera (1979), is also included in the model. The greater the number of effective
parties (i.e., a more fragmented legislature), the greater the odds that the presidential party
will not control a majority of seats in the legislature, exerting a strong pressure on the
president to form a coalition government (Cheibub, 2007). In a scenario of high legislative
fragmentation, given the greater number of political parties with legislative representation,
the president has more options on how to compose her cabinet. Depending on the distribution
of legislative parties in the policy space, for example, the legislative fragmentation can make it
attractive for the president to offer portfolios to a pivotal party in the legislature (Cheibub,
2007), or distribute portfolios to several political parties comprising a highly fragmented
cabinet. Therefore, the effective number of parties works as a measure of complexity of the
bargaining environment.
The inclusion of the number of portfolios controls for the possible incentive of the presi-
dent to increase the portfolios only to artificially make the cabinet seem more proportional
in regards to the distribution of ministerial posts among the members of the coalition. As
my dependent variable (president’s portfolio balance) is measured by the difference between
governing parties’ portfolio share and governing parties’ legislative seat share contribution
to the coalition, it is important to isolate the variation of this measurement that is explained
by my main independent variable (president’s policy-making powers), and the variation ex-
plained by an increase in the total number of cabinet portfolios available.
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2.6 Empirical Analysis: Results and Interpretation
Table 2.2 presents the results for the main empirical implication tested in this study,
i.e., the greater the president’s policy-making powers, the greater the president’s portfolio
balance. Controlling for electoral year, effective number of parties, and number of portfolios,
the results support the empirical expectation. The estimate for president’s policy-making
powers is positive and statistically significant at level 0.05, indicating that the greater the
president’s policy-making provisions, the greater the president’s portfolio share.
Table 2.2: President’s Portfolio Balance Within Presidential Democracies
President’s Policy-Making Powers 0.355∗
(0.206)
Electoral Year −0.053
(0.044)
Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 0.012
(0.010)
Number of Portfolios 0.017∗
(0.007)
Constant −0.535∗
(0.106)
N 187
R2 0.14
RMSE 0.250
Notes: Dependent variable: President’s Portfolio Balance (PPB).
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗ p < 0.05.
Considering the highest score for president’s policy-making powers (equal to 1) (i.e.,
presidents with the highest level of policy-making powers), and holding the control variables
constant, the presidents’s party receives, on average, a surplus of almost 4 percent of the share
of portfolios, as would be expected considering the share of legislative seats the formateur’s
party is contributing to the coalition. At its lowest score, with president’s policy-making
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powers equal to 0 (i.e., presidents holding the lowest level of policy-making powers), and
holding the control variables constant, the president’s party loses, on average, 5 percent of
the share of portfolios compared to the share of legislative seats it contributes to the coalition
(constant estimate equal to -0.53 and significant at level 0.05).
In more substantive terms, El Salvadorian president Mauricio Funes (2009-2013) held
the lowest score for president’s policy-making powers in the dataset at 0.26, and his party
FMN contributed 75 percent of the legislative seats to the coalition, while controlled only 54
(2009), 41 (2010), and 33 (2011) percent of the portfolios available in the cabinet. In 2012
and 2013, the FMNL contributed with 94 percent of the legislative seats to the coalition,
but held only 25 and 17 percent, respectively, of the portfolios available. Chilean president
Eduardo Frei (1998 and 1999) held the highest score for president’s policy-making powers
in the dataset at 0.71, and his party Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) contributed 58
percent of the legislative seats to the coalition, and controlled 66 percent of the portfolios
available in the cabinet. Brazil in 2016, under the administration of Michel Temer, is a
clear case of a proportional distribution of portfolios. The score for Brazilian president’s
policy-making powers in 2016 is the median value for my main independent variable in the
dataset, equal to 0.52. In that year, following the impeachment of the former president Dilma
Roussef, Temer formed a new cabinet in which the president’s party Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro (MDB) controlled 19 percent of the cabinet portfolios available while contributing
20 percent of the legislative seats of the coalition, resulting in a president’s portfolio balance
equal to -0.01.
In sum, the findings provide evidence for my theory. On average, and controlling for
possible confounders, a greater bonus of portfolio share to the president’s party is found in
those countries in which the president is less dependent on the legislature and has a greater
opportunity to create, influence, and enact her policy agenda, i.e., presidents that are con-
stitutionally empowered with greater policy-making powers.
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2.6.1 Robustness Checks
The analysis of particular institutional features that comprise the president’s policy-
making powers index can provide more leverage on the role that specific presidential powers
have on the variation of the president’s portfolio balance. Table 2.3 presents the results when
using the indicators that comprise the president’s policy-making powers index as independent
variables. The efficiency stage, measuring presidential veto powers, was further disaggregated
to have total and partial veto powers as independent variables.
Table 2.3: Disaggregating Presidents’ Policy-Making Powers Index
Dependent variable: Formateur’s Advantage
(Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7)
Decree Power 0.169∗
(0.054)
Initiative Stage 0.364∗
(0.070)
Constitutive Stage 0.473∗
(0.136)
Total Veto −0.426∗
(0.075)
Partial Veto −0.093
(0.059)
Bicameral Symmetry −0.102
(0.063)
Constant −0.157∗ −0.255∗ −0.237∗ 0.130∗ −0.002 0.033
(0.037) (0.048) (0.057) (0.038) (0.040) (0.030)
N 187 165 178 187 187 132
R2 0.051 0.141 0.065 0.149 0.013 0.020
RMSE 0.260 0.233 0.258 0.246 0.265 0.192
Notes: Dependent variable: President’s Portfolio Balance.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗ p < 0.05.
The estimate for decree power in Model 2 of Table 2.3 is positive and significant at level
0.05, indicating that as the president’s decree powers increases, holding the other variables
constant, the president’s portfolio balance also increases. On average, in countries where
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the president is empowered with greater decree powers, the president’s party receives a
surplus of around 2 percent of the share of portfolios. In the dataset, countries in which the
president does not have the power to issue decrees (e.g. Venezuela until 1999, and Bolivia
and El Salvador) tend to have a more proportional distribution of portfolios. However, as
the decree powers of the president increases, especially in those cases with a value of decree
power higher than 0.66 (e.g., Chile, Panama, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru), the
president’s portfolio balance also increases.
Both estimates for the initiative stage and constitutive stage are positive and significant at
level 0.05. As these results indicate, controlling for other presidential powers, the greater the
number of areas in which the president has exclusive initiative to legislate and the greater
the capacity of the president to request urgency for her projects, the share of portfolios
controlled by the president’s party increases. Simultaneously, as the capacity of legislators
to amend bill proposals decreases, the president’s portfolio share also increases. The estimate
for bicameral symmetry does not achieve statistical significance, suggesting that either the
symmetry of the bicameral system does not seem to affect the president’s portfolio balance
or its effect is nullified by the effect of the other indicators of presidential powers.
The estimates for veto powers are at odds with the expectations. As veto powers give the
president an opportunity to object to a bill in its entirety or nullify specific provisions of a bill,
it was expected that the greater the veto powers of the president, the greater the president’s
portfolio balance. However, the estimate for total veto power is significant at level 0.01 and
in the opposite direction, and the estimate for partial veto power is also in the opposite
direction, although not significant. According to Alemán and Schwartz (2006, p. 98) who
analyze presidential vetoes in Latin American constitutions, presidential veto powers are
“richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated.” Indridason
(2011) also found that, at odds with the expectation of partial veto as the strongest type
of presidential veto power, the partial veto has an ambiguous effect on the balance of power
between the executive and the legislature. Palanza and Sin (2014), in turn, found that the
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level of significance of a bill is a better predictor of vetoes and that whether the president
holds a majority in the legislature does not seem to explain variations in the likelihood of
vetoes. It is also important to add that the negative estimate for total veto power is not
strong to the point that it nullifies the positive effect of the other indicators. How veto
powers can affect the distribution of portfolios in presidential democracies is a topic worthy
of future exploration.
These results of each of the indicators that comprise the index for president’s policy-
making powers calls attention to the importance of testing particular institutional features
that can affect the distribution of portfolios to presidential parties. A president’s decree
power, exclusive ability to initiate legislation in certain areas, and the capacity to request
urgency seem to have a higher impact on the variation of the president’s portfolio share within
presidential democracies than presidential veto powers. Nevertheless, this result does not
obviate the strong positive relationship between president’s policy-making powers embedded
in the index.
In order to further evaluate the consistency of the findings, I conducted other robustness
checks in the Appendix. A benchmark model with the main independent variable and no con-
trol variables was conducted (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). In Table A.5 of the Appendix,
I conducted a model using an alternative measurement for the powers of the president devel-
oped by Doyle and Elgie (2014), who claim a a greater reliability of cross-national measures
of presidential power for their index. My main model was estimated using Montero’s index
(2009) instead of Doyle and Elgie’s measurement (2014) due to Doyle and Elgie’s focus on
the broad powers of the president, such as the relationship between the president and the
judiciary, and Montero’s index being more focused on the policy-making powers of the pres-
ident, making this measurement more valid for my analysis. In Table A.6 of the Appendix,
I ran the main model using a alternative measurements for the policy-making powers of the
president as developed by the United Nations Development Programme (2004). The results
above presented and discussed are consistent with all robustness checks conducted.
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2.7 Conclusion
While parliamentarism is usually defined as a system of mutual dependence between
the executive and the legislative powers, pure presidentialism is usually defined in terms of
executive-legislative relations as a system of mutual independence. In this study, I argue
for a more nuanced comparison between these systems of government. Because they depend
on a legislative majority to survive and to legislate, prime ministers are more dependent
upon the legislature than presidents. However, the absence of a no-confidence constraint
in presidential systems does not make presidents less dependent on the legislature in order
to make and enact policies. The need for all executives to make policies means that all
presidents are dependent upon the legislature to some degree.
I then advance a theory in which the institutional arrangements that define the respective
powers of the president and the legislature to shape the policy agenda can explain the
variation of the president’s dependence on the legislature to legislate. The degree on the
ability of the president to shape the legislative agenda has clear implications on the process
of government formation, and on our understanding of the executive-legislative relations
between and within systems of government.
My theory is consistent with some existing predictions on government formation in par-
liamentary and presidential systems, but also makes novel predictions. The absence of a
no-confidence constraint in presidential systems leads to an empirical expectation of a for-
mateur’s advantage. Data from a set of 30 parliamentary and presidential democracies
demonstrate that, controlling for the share of legislative seats each party brings to the coali-
tion, the formateur’s advantage is more prevalent in presidential systems. On average, the
proportionality between portfolio share and seat share contribution by coalition parties is
more prevalent in parliamentary democracies (e.g., more proportional cabinets). Neverthe-
less, in this study I show that there is a substantial variation in the allocation of portfolios
to presidential parties; from cases in which the president’s party has a deficit in the share of
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portfolios to cases of a bonus in the portfolio share of the president’s party. I also reveal that,
similar to what we see in parliamentary democracies, a proportional distribution of portfolios
also occurs in presidential systems. This variation in the share of portfolios controlled by
the president’s party is a clear empirical implication of the theory advanced in this study.
As revealed by the results, the likelihood of a more proportional distribution of portfo-
lios and a deficit in the share of portfolios controlled by the president’s party increases as
the president’s ability to shape the legislative agenda decreases. If the president is more
dependent upon the legislature to make and enact policies, then the balance of power in
presidential cabinets is more likely to reflect the balance of power in the legislature. In this
case, the presidential cabinet can be very similar to the proportional cabinets usually formed
in parliamentary systems. However, when institutional provisions allow some presidents
greater leeway in making and enacting policies, then a more disproportional distribution of
portfolios to the benefit of the president’s party is expected.
This finding is particularly clear when considering presidential policy-making powers as
a weighted sum index. The effects of particular institutional features on the president’s
portfolio share, however, are mixed. While strong decree powers, exclusivity to legislate,
and capacity to request urgency seem to be powerful tools in the hands of presidents to
receive a bonus share of portfolios, veto powers fail to explain variations in the president’s
portofolio balance. This result compels us to better understand the mechanisms of specific
institutional features and constitutional powers the presidents possess as the formateur in
the government formation process. Besides the policy-making powers covered in this study,
other presidential prerogatives such as discretion over the budget process are interesting
constitutional powers worthy of further exploration.
Although the findings on the variation in the distribution of portfolios to presidents’ par-
ties is a contribution to the literature on the process of government formation in presidential
systems—especially when compared to the vast literature in parliamentary systems—these
findings reveal a more substantive theoretical contribution of this study. By conceiving leg-
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islative constraint as a continuous variable that varies with the president’s ability to make
and enact policy in the legislature, this study enhances our understanding of the relationship
between the executive and legislature in different systems of government. The literature com-
paring parliamentary and presidential systems of government goes from studies assuming a
rigid distinction between these forms of government to studies suggesting similarities between
these systems, including similar incentives for coalition formation in both systems of govern-
ment. This study clarifies when and why we should expect similarities across presidential
and parliamentary democracies.
The findings of this study also open several promising new paths for future research.
When confronted with a legislative minority, presidents can either attempt to govern through
cabinet coalitions or through legislative coalitions. In this study, I focus on the first of these
strategies. The trade-off between resources and policy priorities in the president’s attempt
to form a coalition, as described in this study, might help to explain the decision presidents
make to govern through a legislative coalition. Understanding the consequences for policy
outcomes across governments with more or less proportional distribution of portfolios is an-
other interesting topic to consider in the future. The incorporation and measurement of
other tools available to legislators to influence policy, such as the power of legislative com-
mittees and the effectiveness of the opposition in the legislature, might clarify the bargaining
process in the distribution of ministerial posts between the president and legislative parties.
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3. WHY AND WHEN DO PRESIDENTIAL CABINET MEMBERS
MONITOR EACH OTHER?
3.1 Introduction
Coalition governance inevitably boils down to an ongoing contest between partners to
maximize their political power, with coalition partners adopting monitoring and control
mechanisms to reduce their agency loss and solving conflicts arising from delegation. Studies
on coalition governments in parliamentary systems have shown that coalition partners inquire
about the ideological profiles of ministers and parties that will hold portfolios (Müller and
Strøm, 2003), appoint junior ministers to monitor and maximize the oversight of cabinet
members (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011), appoint officials to the top ranks of
the ministerial bureaucracy who are aligned with the executive agenda (Lewis, 2009), issue
regulatory decrees to limit the action of coalition partners (Bawn, 1995; Huber and Shipan,
2002), and use legislative commissions to scrutinize proposals originating from ministries
controlled by other cabinet parties (Martin and Vanberg, 2004, 2011; Carroll and Cox, 2012).
There is no reason to believe that principal-agent dilemmas—where agents are motivated
to act in their own interests, which can be contrary to those of their principals—are present
only in coalition governments in parliamentary systems. A recent literature on presidential
democracies under coalition governments demonstrates that the use of strategies to mitigate
the consequences of delegation by the president is expected (Inácio and Rezende, 2015;
Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter, 2015; Freitas, 2016b; Pereira et al., 2017). There is evidence
that presidents appoint nonpartisan ministers when party-affiliated ministers are not reliable
(Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter, 2015), and appoint junior ministers (Pereira et al., 2017) to
ministerial portfolios to preclude or solve intra-coalition conflicts in presidential governments.
Different from the literature on parliamentary systems that identifies monitoring activities
between coalition partners within the executive and legislative branches, the literature on
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presidential systems has thus far been restricted to both the arena in which the monitoring
takes place—i.e., the executive arena—and to the actor that initiates the monitoring, i.e., the
president. In this study, I demonstrate that coalition partners in presidential democracies
also monitor policy implementation, and explain the conditions under which they are more
or less likely to do so.
I argue that, similar to parliamentary systems, coalition partners in presidential systems
monitor the policies implemented by one another to reduce the information deficit coming
from heterogeneous cabinets—i.e., cabinets formed by ideologically-distant parties. The
empirical implication is that as the ideological distance between cabinet parties increases,
greater policy monitoring between coalition partners is expected. I also theorize that certain
institutional features of presidential systems—particularly the capacity of the president to
fire ministers without fear of a government breakdown—lead to increased policy monitoring
initiatives from junior partners as compared to the president’s party.
I test my argument using evidence from Brazil, by means of a mechanism called “Request
for Access to Information” (RIC) which allows Brazilian legislators to request information on
matters pertaining to the implementation of policies from any minister of the executive cab-
inet. I analyze all RICs initiated by Brazilian legislators between 1995 and 2014 (comprising
over 20,000 requests). This analysis covers 15 multiparty cabinets formed in Brazil, including
governments from a range of ideological positions. The results support my expectations of
greater policy monitoring between coalition partners and greater monitoring efforts initiated
by junior partners under more ideologically-heterogeneous cabinets.
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the literature on conflicts and tensions
in coalition governance. In section 3, I present my argument and my contribution to this
literature. In section 4, I show how the composition of multiparty cabinets in the Brazilian
presidential system creates incentives for parties to monitor the public policy implementation
actions of their cabinet partners, justifying the use of this case for my empirical analysis.
The main results are interpreted and discussed in section 5. Final comments are presented
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in section 6.
3.2 Delegation and Information Asymmetry in Coalition Governments
According to Martin and Vanberg (2011, p. 3-4), the delegation of ministerial authority
to different parties leads to a dilemma of coalition governance: “To govern successfully,
coalition partners must be able to overcome the inherent tension between their collective
interest in mutual accommodation and their individual incentives to pursue their particular
policy objectives.” This dilemma highlights the fact that cabinet ministers in coalition
governments act as agents of two potentially competing principals: their respective party
leaders in the legislature and the executive government (based on the cabinet collective
compromise and cabinet responsibility when the government is formed). With the exception
of non-partisan ministers, ministers must belong to parties with legislative representation
(accountable to their constituencies), while agreeing (and compromising) on the collective
goals of the executive cabinet, i.e., making joint policies with other coalition partners.
The conflict between these two features—i.e., a joint governance and policy-making with
a separate electoral accountability—leads to a potential problem in coalition governments.
Under a context of preference divergence and uncertainty between the members of the coali-
tion, ministers may be tempted to take advantage of their position’s inherent access to
privileged information while controlling a portfolio, and act opportunistically to bring poli-
cies towards their ideal policy position (Thies, 2001; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008;
Strøm, Müller, and Smith, 2010; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). While this behavior might
violate the compromise the ministers’ parties agreed upon when they entered the coalition,
this ministerial drift from the compromise might favor their own (and their party’s) electoral
ideals. Hence, delegating the control of ministries to different political parties might mean
losing privileged information access to important policy areas.
In order to prevent ministerial drift, coalition parties must develop mechanisms that
constrain the ability of individual ministers to undermine the coalition compromise. A well-
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known mechanism in parliamentary systems used to “shadow” the work of ministers from
other coalition parties is the assignment of junior ministers. The actions taken by junior
ministers involve the acquisition of information, on the assumption that if the coalition
partner knows that information is being acquired, the potential drifter will refrain from
drifting. Junior ministers therefore serve as watchdogs and help coalition partners keep tabs
on one another (Thies, 2001).
Besides the nomination of junior ministers, other common investigative tools utilized by
coalition partners to prevent ministerial policy drift in parliamentary systems are exten-
sive screening of prospective ministers (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Strøm, 1995, 2000;
Saalfeld, 2000), written coalition agreements (Müller and Strøm, 2008; Moury, 2010; Indri-
dason and Kristinsson, 2013), and cabinet reshuffles by the prime minister (Indridason and
Kam, 2008).
The parliament itself is another venue through which coalition parties can monitor one
another and solve intra-coalition conflicts (Martin and Vanberg, 2004, 2005, 2011; Kim and
Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll and Cox, 2012). Common parliamentary means to extract in-
formation from coalition partners are parliamentary questions and interpellations (Wiberg,
1995; Martin, 2011), and permanent or ad hoc parliamentary committees (Mattson and
Strøm, 1995; Kim and Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll and Cox, 2012).
Moreover, the policy monitoring between the opposition and the government and between
the prime minister and his coalition partners are not the only directions in which monitoring
occurs. With evidence from the Netherlands and Germany, Martin and Vanberg (2004,
2005) demonstrate that parliamentary committees under coalition governments scrutinize
executive bills initiated not only by the opposition, but also by coalition partners. Martin
and Vanberg (2004) found that the greater the ideological divergence between coalition
partners, the greater the parliamentary scrutiny of a relevant bill (i.e., the bill is held under
deliberation by a committee for a longer period of time, and the number of changes introduced
to the bill by the committee is greater).
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Similar to parliamentary systems, ministers are central actors in the policy-making pro-
cess in presidential systems (Martínez-Gallardo, 2010). Given the incentives for a president
to form a coalition when their party does not control a majority of the seats in the legis-
lature (Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg, 2014), there is no reason to believe
that principal-agent dilemmas are present only in coalition governments in parliamentary
systems. In fact, due to the separate electoral origin of the executive and legislative powers,
scholars suggest that presidential democracies are more prone to principal-agent issues than
parliamentary democracies (Carey, 2007; Samuels and Shugart, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo and
Schleiter, 2015).
A recent literature on presidential systems has also demonstrated the use of mechanisms
by which presidents can contain or reduce the risks of delegation under coalition governments.
Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter (2015) argue that the appointment of nonpartisan ministers
is a mechanism exercised by the president to limit her agency loss, particularly when party-
affiliated ministers are not reliable options for the president. The greater the goal divergence
between the president and her party, and the fewer the president’s resources to control
her party, the greater the likelihood that the president will select a non-partisan minister
(Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter, 2015).
With Brazil as a case study, Pereira et al. (2017) reveal that junior ministers (secretários
executivos) are also used by presidents to solve intra-coalition conflicts in presidential govern-
ments. The primary purpose of secretários executivos is to assist the minister in supervising
and coordinating the activities within the ministry. Pereira et al. (2017) found that the
greater the distance between the preferences of the coalition partners and the president
(increasing the risks of policy drift), the greater the likelihood of a president appointing a
non-partisan secretário executivo or a secretário executivo affiliated with a political party
different from that of the minister.
This literature on mechanisms to solve intra-coalition conflicts in presidential systems is
restricted to the arena in which the monitoring takes place, and to the actor that initiates
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the monitoring. Studies that explore policy monitoring in presidential systems restrict their
analyses to monitoring within the executive arena and focus either on the relationship be-
tween presidents and their own party in single-party governments (Martínez-Gallardo and
Schleiter, 2015), or between the president and the junior partners in coalition governments
(Pereira et al., 2017). In this study, I capture the complexities of policy monitoring under
presidential coalition governments, analyzing the flow of policy monitoring between all coali-
tion members (junior and senior partners) within the legislative arena.
3.3 Why and When Do Presidential Cabinet Members Monitor One Another?
Coalition governments require a joint governance between parties with distinct prefer-
ences on specific issues and with a potential separate electoral accountability. As stated by
Strøm and Müller (1999, p. 257),
Coalition governments manifest some sort of bargain struck between their par-
ticipating parties. Political parties, or more specifically their leaders, are likely
to have different preferences over a broad range of issues, driven at least in part
by their motivation to secure for themselves policy benefits, office benefits, and
electoral advantage. All of these goods are likely to be scarce, so that not all
demands can be satisfied simultaneously. [. . . ] Electoral advantage is even more
strictly constant-sum. Ultimately, one party’s gain has to be someone else’s loss.
In some cases, all incumbent parties may be able to gain at the expense of the op-
position, but, much more commonly, coalition parties are in some sort of mutual
competition for votes.
The distribution of portfolios by the president in coalition governments, analyzed in
the first chapter of this dissertation, can be seen as a delegation of authority over policies
to parties with divergent policy preferences. The minister with jurisdiction in a specific
ministerial post enjoys a considerable informational advantage over his cabinet partners,
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and takes the lead in implementing policy proposals in that area. In this sense, the features
that create principal-agent issues in coalition governance under parliamentary systems—i.e.,
preference divergences between coalition partners and mutual competition for votes—are
also present in presidential systems.
Ministers, as agents of their parties (and constituencies), may use their discretion to fur-
ther their party’s goals and move policies closer to their ideal positions. Once the minister
is assigned to a particular portfolio, coalition partners are limited by time and resources
to detect policy departures from the coalition compromise. Therefore, ministers should be
shadowed if governing parties seek to minimize the information and discretion loss they suffer
due to ministers pursuing their own parties’ interests rather than the coalition’s interests.
In a world with complete information or no preference divergence, these policy monitoring
mechanisms would not be necessary. But the principal-agent issues arising from coalition
parties with divergent preferences among policies is a game of incomplete information, mak-
ing monitoring between coalition members necessary.
The informational asymmetry and the risk of ministerial drift should be more problem-
atic in coalition governments if the ideological distance between coalition partners is greater.
If the coalition were ideologically homogeneous, there would be no conflict between the min-
isters’ policy goals and the goals pursued by the coalition government. As coalition partners
become more ideologically distant from each other, ministers then face strong incentives to
deviate from coalition compromises and pursue their own (and their party’s) interests, thus
creating incentives for coalition partners to keep tabs on one another.
In this study, I argue that, similar to parliamentary systems, the parties that comprise
the government’s cabinet will monitor the policies implemented by their government partners
to reduce the information deficit coming from heterogeneous cabinets—i.e., cabinets formed
by ideologically-distant parties. The empirical implication is that as the ideological distance
among cabinet parties increases, greater policy monitoring between coalition partners is
expected.
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While this empirical implication is heavily based on the extensive literature on policy
monitoring under coalition governments in parliamentary systems, I also theorize that the
capacity of the president to fire ministers without fear of a government breakdown leads
to increased policy monitoring initiatives from junior partners as compared to presidential
parties. Because the government does not rely on the vote of confidence in presidential
systems, presidents can change the composition of their cabinets at their discretion during
their term in office, without fear of early elections.
While breaking the coalition in presidential systems does not seem as devastating as a
new election might be in parliamentary systems, the capacity of the president to remove min-
isters without fear of a government breakdown is a credible threat, making the promise by
the junior parties to support the president’s legislative agenda also credible. This is because
the president’s tenure (i.e., the fixed-term nature of the president’s office) is not threatened
(at least not immediately) when she withdraws portfolios from junior parties, and junior
partners care about policy and the perks and resources they have access to when they are
part of the government (Raile, Pereira, and Power, 2011). Therefore, a second hypothesis to
be tested in this study is that the power of the president to freely select and remove min-
isters without fear of a government breakdown increases the likelihood of policy monitoring
initiatives from junior partners as compared to the president’s party.
3.4 Policy Monitoring in a Presidential Democracy: Evidence from Brazil
Due to Brazil’s high electoral and party fragmentation, it is hardly possible for the
president-elected party to form a legislative majority by itself. Consequently, the formation
of coalition governments has been a constant in Brazil’s democracy (Figueiredo and Limongi,
2007). In addition to a large number of parties, the cabinets formed in Brazil have been
marked by a considerable ideological heterogeneity, comprising parties with multiple and
divergent policy preferences (Power and Zucco Jr., 2009, 2012; Gaylord and Rennó, 2015),
making Brazilian multiparty presidentialism an appropriate case to test my argument.
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To conduct the empirical analysis of this study I use evidence from Brazil, in particular
the use of a legislative prerogative available to Brazilian legislators, called “Request for Access
to Information” (RIC). A key tool in the list of accountability resources for the legislative
branch, the RIC is a formal and low-cost mechanism for monitoring policies implemented by
the executive branch. By requesting access to information through RIC, Brazilian legislators
can oversee any act, action or program related to the implementation of public policies from
any portfolio of the cabinet.
The requested ministers are required to share the information on any policy being imple-
mented under a portfolio they control.1 To illustrate what kind of information is requested
by a legislator from a coalition partner, two facsimilia of RICs are presented in Appendix
B.1. The first RIC (Figure B.1) was initiated by Roland Lavigne, a legislator affiliated with
the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), which was a member of the coalition
formed in the second term of FHC in 2001. The legislator requested information from the
Ministry of Environment (then controlled by the minister José Sarney Filho, affiliated with
the Green Party [PV]) with regards to the deforestation of the Atlantic Forest in the Brazilian
State of Bahia.
The second RIC (Figure B.2) was initiated by the legislator Vanessa Grazziotin, affiliated
with the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB), which was a member of the coalition formed by
Lula in 2006. Grazziotin, who was a federal deputy for the Brazilian State of Amazonas at
the time, questioned the Ministry of Education (then controlled by the minister Fernando
Haddad from the presidential party PT) with regards to the investment of roughly 5 million
reais for actions related to indigenous education programs. She asked the ministry to specify
the amount, and to detail how the money would be allocated to each of the programs, and
to which municipalities. The legislator also asked the ministry to detail the amount to be
transfered by state, as well as to describe the amount allocated to each of the activities within
1As prescribed by Article 116 of the Rules of Procedure of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, if a minister
does not send the information requested within 30 days from the day the RIC was initiated, the minister
becomes subject to prosecution by the Federal Supreme Court.
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the program. In the State of Amazonas, for which the legislature was a federal deputy, she
asked for the specification of the amount destined for each municipality.
In this study, RIC is used as a measure for policy implementation monitoring for at least
three reasons: First, the cost of filing the application to request access to information on
policies is very low (Lemos and Power, 2013), so differences in the number of RICs initiated
by legislators should then reflect a deliberate strategy by the legislator rather than inherent
limitations or difficulties to access this resource. To initiate a RIC, a legislator needs only
to present the request in the legislative plenary. The RIC is then registered with the Board
of Directors of the Chamber of Deputies, and then goes directly to the requested ministry
responsible for the policy. Second, parties do not need to negotiate their support in formal
instances—e.g., leadership positions, commissions, and blocs—to monitor policies of their
interest (Lemos, 2005). Finally, RICs allow us to objectively measure strategies used by
cabinet parties to reduce the information deficit resulting from the delegation of power,
and to empirically test strategies that usually occur behind the scenes and through internal
political bargains.
All legislators can initiate a RIC (question a minister) on a policy being implemented
in a specific cabinet portfolio.2 These legislators can be either from the president’s party,
from a governing party, or from a party in the opposition. Only ministers can be requested
to release information on policies. Within the coalition, the president’s party, a governing
party, or an independent minister (not affiliated with a political party) can be questioned
about the policies being implemented in their portfolios.3 As non-partisan ministers cannot
be classified ideologically, they are not considered in this study.
Figure 3.1 represents the directions and all levels of policy monitoring considering a
cabinet coalition formed by three political parties: the president’s party, and two junior
2From a procedural point of view, any legislator from the Brazilian Congress (federal deputies and sena-
tors) may initiate a Request for Access to Information. Due to data availability, in this study I am focusing
only on requests initiated by legislators within the lower house.
3To avoid duplicates, RICs initiated by legislators from the president’s party are treated separately; that
is, they are not included among the RICs initiated by governing parties.
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partners A and B. Policy monitoring at the same level are identified with the same scale of
gray in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: All Levels of Policy Monitoring (Within and Between Coalition Partners)
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As depicted in Figure 3.1, policy monitoring can occur: 1. “within coalition partners”
(either presidential or junior parties within the coalition); 2. “from the president’s party to a
junior party” (either junior party A or B); 3. “from a junior party to the president’s party,”
and; 4. “between junior parties,” (A and B).
In this study, I argue that policy monitoring over policy implementation (through the
use of RIC) among cabinet partners will be higher the greater the divergence of coalition
partners’ preferences over policies, i.e., cabinets that are ideologically dispersed (heteroge-
neous cabinets). By anticipating the information asymmetry produced by the delegation of
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ministry control in coalition governments comprised of ideologically-distant parties, cabinet
partners should increase their use of RICs to seek information on policies that are being
implemented in portfolios controlled by other members of the coalition.
Regarding the expectation of greater policy monitoring initiatives between coalition part-
ners compared to presidential parties, this means that we should see a higher number of RICs
“from a junior party to the president’s party” and “between junior parties” as compared to
the president party’s initiatives.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
With the exception of RICs—gathered by the use of machine learning techniques from
the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies—the data used in the analyses were gathered from the
Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP), the Center for Metropolitan Stud-
ies (CEM/Cepid), and the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). The
analysis covers all RICs initiated by coalition partners from 1991 to 2014, including gov-
ernments from a range of ideological positions; the right-leaning government of Fernando
Collor de Mello (Collor) (1990-1992), the center-right leaning government of Itamar Franco
(Franco) (1992-1994), the center-right leaning government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(FHC) (1995-2002), and the center-left leaning governments of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva
(Lula) (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (Dilma) (2011-2014).
To test the effect of the heterogeneity of the cabinet on the number of RICs initiated and
the increased initiatives made by junior partners, the information requirements presented in
the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies between 1991 and 2014 were grouped in units of time,
i.e., number of RICs initiated per quarter.
The choice of this unit of time is justified by evidence that intra-cabinet conflicts require
time to manifest within the legislature (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999) and due to data
availability for ideological heterogeneity. I assume that three months is enough time for
parties to mobilize and seek information on programs and policies that interest them. In
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addition, grouping RICs by quarter provides a sufficient variation in the variables of interest.
3.5.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a count variable—i.e., number of RICs initiated per quarter—
and it ranges from two to 326 RICs initiated. There are five types of initiated RICs included
in the count: 1. “from the president’s party to the president’s party;" 2. “from the president’s
party to a junior party;" 3. “from a junior party to the president’s party;" 4. “within coalition
partners” (either a president’s party or a junior party), and; 5. “between junior partners.”4
3.5.2 Independent Variables
Ideological Dispersion (Heterogeneity). This variable measures the degree of ideological
heterogeneity of the parties that comprise the executive cabinet and was calculated based
on the scores from Brazilian legislative surveys conducted by Power and Zucco Jr. (2012).
Power and Zucco Jr. (2012) estimate the ideological position of the parties represented in
the Brazilian Congress from 1990 to 2013 on a left-right spectrum. The level of ideological
dispersion within the cabinet can be expressed as |Pfl − Pfr|, where Pfl is the ideological
position on the left-right continuum of the furthest-left party represented in the cabinet,
and Pfr is the ideological position on the left-right continuum of the furthest-right party
represented in the cabinet. In the sample, the variable ranges from 0.35—the minimum
value for ideological heterogeneity (that is, an almost ideologically-homogeneous cabinet)—
to 6.13—the most ideologically-heterogeneous cabinet in the sample.
President’s approval rate. This is an indicator of the president’s popularity among vot-
ers. This measurement is built on the proportion of survey respondents that evaluate the
president’s job approval as “great,” “very good,” or “good.”5 I included this variable into the
model to evaluate whether the empirical expectation of a greater policy monitoring under
heterogeneous cabinets is supported while controlling for events exogenous to the cabinet.
4Descriptive statistics can be viewed in Table B.1 of Appendix B.2.
5The data for “president’s approval rate” are based on surveys systematized by the “Center for Metropoli-
tan Studies” (CEM/Cepid) and can be accessed at: http://centrodametropole.org.br/avaliacao/
presidentes/home.
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It is expected that the government will receive the most oversight when the president’s per-
formance and popularity are rated poorly (as measured by the president’s approval rate and
economic performance, described below). The least-popular president in the sample is Collor
de Mello during his impeachment process in the last quarter of 1992, with a nine percent
approval rating. The most popular president in the sample is Lula at the end of his second
term in the last quarter of 2010, with an 83 percent approval rating.
Inflation. This variable is a measurement of the consumer price index (CPI), reflecting
the quarterly percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket
of goods and services. This variable also works as a control for events exogenous to the
cabinet. As demonstrated in the third chapter of this dissertation, inflation is one of the
main predictors of cabinet breakdown. It is expected that the greater the inflation, the
greater the policy monitoring between coalition partners. In the sample, this variable has a
mean value of 4.96 percent, with a standard deviation of 10.64 percent. The minimum value
of the sample is a deflation of -0.17 in the third quarter of Lula’s presidency in 2010. The
maximum value is 44.52 percent in the third quarter of Franco’s presidency in 1994. The
period of hyperinflation in Brazil (from 1990 to 1995) presents disproportionate values for
this variable, making the distribution of the variable extremely skewed. For this reason, this
was log transformed.6
First Quarter. Due to Summer recess in Brazil, legislative sessions do not occur in the
month of January. Thus, the number of RICs equal to zero in January does not represent a
deliberate decision from legislators to decrease oversight, but rather an absence of activities
in the Lower House of Brazilian Congress. In order to control for the absence of activities in
January (one-third of the quarter unit of time of the dependent variable), a dummy variable
for the first quarter of each year was included in the analysis (in which 1 represents the first
quarter, and 0 otherwise). The logical expectation is a decrease in the use of RICs in the
6Due to negative values for inflation, 0.2 was added to all values of inflation before log-transforming the
variable. The distributions of the variables—including the distribution for the log transformed inflation—can
be viewed in Appendix B.3.
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first quarter.
PMDB; PSDB; PT. Dummy variables for the governments of PMDB, PSDB, and PT
were included to control for potential specificities of governments. Fernando Collor de Mello
was affiliated with the National Reconstruction Party (PRN) (the baseline category in the
models), and served as President of Brazil from March 15, 1990 until his impeachment from
office on December 29, 1992. Itamar Franco was affiliated with the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party (PMDB), and served as President of Brazil from December 29, 1992 to
December 31, 1994. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) was affiliated with the Brazilian
Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and served as President of Brazil from January 1, 1995
to December 31, 2002 for two terms (1995-1998 and 1999-2002). Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
(Lula) was affiliated with the Worker’s Party (PT), and served as President of Brazil from
January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2010 for two terms (2003-2006 and 2007-2010). Dilma
Roussef (Dilma) was affiliated with the Worker’s Party (PT), and served as President of
Brazil for two terms (2011-2014 and 2015-2016), holding the position from January 1, 2011
until her impeachment and removal from office on August 31, 2016. The data do not include
the second term of Dilma Roussef.
3.6 Results and Discussion
A Poisson regression is used to model the dependent count variable—i.e., the number
of RICs initiated per quarter. This is the best approach considering that the distribution
of counts is discrete, limited to non-negative values, and positively skewed, which includes
observations in the data set with a value of 0.7 Therefore, it is assumed that the errors follow
a Poisson distribution, and rather than modeling the dependent variable as a linear function
of the regression coefficients, the natural log of the dependent variable, ln(Y ), is modeled as
a linear function of the coefficients.8
7The distribution of the observed values of the variables can be seen in Figure B.3 of Appendix B.3.
8The Poisson model also assumes that the mean and variance of the errors are equal. But as the variance
of the dependent variable is larger than the mean in the sample, an alternative model, the negative binomial
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Given the time series structure of the data (by year and quarter), cautions were taken
to handle possible periodicity and trends in the dependent variable. The frequency of the
dependent variable per quarter, unit root tests, and autocorrelation analysis are presented
in Appendix B.4. Although the unit root tests indicate that the data is stationary, a clear
periodicity is present. Further serial dependence analysis were then conducted, and the
autocorrelation function (ACF) indicates the presence of an autoregressive term in the data.
The partial autocorrelation function reveals that the order of the autoregressive term might
be of first or fourth order. For this reason, the analyses were conducted using auto-regressive
(AR) models. No significant differences were found in the results using AR(1) or AR(4)
models. The results from AR(0) and AR(1) models are presented below.9
Table 3.1 shows the estimates for the effect of the independent variable “heterogeneity”
on the number of RICs initiated. Following my expectation, controlling for all other factors
included in the model, as the ideological dispersion (heterogeneity) of the cabinet increases,
the number of RICs initiated also increases (Model 1).
The estimates for “heterogeneity” are positive and statistically significant at level 0.01
in both models; the benchmark models without controls (Model 1 and Model 2) and the
models including the control variables (Model 2). These results indicate that, holding all
other variables constant, we can infer that the greater the ideological dispersion within
the cabinet, the greater the policy monitoring between the members of the coalition (i.e.,
the greater the number of RICs initiated by coalition members without distinction in the
direction of the initiative).
Although statistically significant in Model 3 and Model 4, “president’s approval” does
not seem to affect the number of RICs initiated by coalition partners due to the small
magnitude of its estimates, when holding all other variables constant. As the estimates for
model, is also conducted. The negative binomial distribution is a form of the Poisson distribution in which
the distribution’s parameter is itself considered a random variable. The variation of this parameter can
account for a variance in the data that is higher than the mean. The results are presented in Table B.2 of
Appendix B.4.
9The models using AR(4) can be viewed in Appendix B.6.
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Table 3.1: Overall Policy Monitoring and Ideological Dispersion
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Benchmark AR(1) Benchmark with Controls AR(1) with Controls
Number of RICst−1 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Ideological Dispersion 0.360∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.027) (0.027)
President’s Approval −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Inflation (log) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019)
First Quarter −0.199∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038)
PMDB 0.016 0.068
(0.112) (0.113)
PSDB 0.665∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.119)
PT 0.222∗ 0.178
(0.125) (0.129)
Constant 2.369∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗ 1.577∗∗∗ 1.804∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.153) (0.153)
N 93 92 93 92
LogLikelihood −1,915.023 −1,840.606 −1,777.960 −1,692.658
AkaikeInf.Crit. 3,834.046 3,687.212 3,571.919 3,403.315
Notes: Dependent variable: Number of RICs initiated per quarter.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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“heterogeneity” remains positive and significant in the models with controls, this result reveals
that the expectation of a greater number of RICs under a heterogeneous cabinet is supported
when controlling for an event that is exogenous to the cabinet. The estimate for “president’s
approval” when conducting negative binomial models to control for over-dispersion is not
significant. The results can be seen in Table B.2 of Appendix B.4.
The estimates for “inflation” in Model 3 and Model 4 are in the opposite direction from
what was expected. Holding all other variables constant, an increase in “inflation” seems to
be correlated with a decrease in the number of RICs initiated by coalition partners. The
coefficients are negative and statistically significant at level 0.01. Related to the findings
presented in the third chapter of this dissertation, the effect of a poorly-performing president
on the country’s economy seems to increase the likelihood of a coalition breakdown rather
than greater monitoring between coalition partners.
The positive and statistically significant estimate for PSDB in Model 3 and Model 4 sug-
gests that during the PSDB government (1995-2002), holding all other variables constant,
the number of RICs initiated was, on average, greater than during the other governments pre-
sented in the analysis. The estimates for PMDB and PT are not significant when conducting
the AR(1) model with controls (Model 4).
The results presented in Table 3.1 reveals an increase in the number of RICs initiated by
coalition partners as the distance between the ideological preferences of the parties that are
members of the cabinet increases. Yet, the results depicted in Table 3.1 identify neither the
author nor the target of the RIC (i.e., whether it is the president’s party or a junior partner
initiative). In order to analyze the flow of policy monitoring between all coalition members
(junior and senior partners) within the legislative arena, the number of RICs initiated per
quarter need to be disaggregated based on the directions depicted in Figure 3.1. The five
directions identifying the author of the initiative and the target are:
1. Presidential Oversight. This direction identifies the number of RICs initiated by a leg-
islator with affiliation to the president’s party. The direction combines RICs initiated
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“from the president’s party to the president’s party” and “from the president’s party to
junior parties.”
2. Junior Parties’ Oversight. This direction identifies the number of RICs initiated by a
legislator with affiliation to a junior partner. The direction combines RICs initiated
“from junior parties to the president’s party,” “within junior parties,” and “between
junior parties.”
3. Specific Target: From the President’s Party to a Junior Partner. This direction identi-
fies the number of RICs initiated by a legislator with affiliation to the president’s party
to a ministry controlled by a junior partner.
4. Specific Target: Junior Partners to the President’s Party. This direction is a subset of
Direction 2, and identifies the number of RICs initiated by a legislator with affiliation
to a junior partner to a ministry controlled by the president’s party.
5. Between Coalition Partners (President’s Party Included). This direction combines the
number of RICs initiated between coalition partners (including the president’s party),
i.e., it combines initiatives “from the president’s party to junior parties,” “from junior
parties to the president’s party,” and “between junior partners.”
6. Between Junior Partners (President’s Party Not Included). This direction is a subset
of Direction 5, and identifies the RICs initiated between junior partners.
The results present in Table 3.2 indicate that policy monitoring occurs at all levels within
the coalition. Different from initial expectations, policy monitoring initiated by governing
parties does not seem to be more prevalent as compared to monitoring efforts initiated by the
president’s party. This is suggested by the positive and significant (at level 0.01) estimates
(with similar magnitudes) for dispersion in all models depicted in Table 3.2.
At odds with initial expectations, holding all other variables constant, “president’s ap-
proval” does not seem to affect the number of RICs initiated in any of the directions identified.
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Although significant at level 0.01 in all models presented in Table 3.2, the magnitude of the
estimate is very close to zero. The results also indicate that “inflation” seems to increase
presidential oversight overall (Model 1). When specific targets are considered (e.g., from
the president’s party to a junior party [Model 3]), holding all other variables constant, an
increase in “inflation” leads to a decreased use of RICs. The same result is found when the
RIC initiatives between partners is considered (see Model 4 and Model 5). As expected, the
results indicate a decrease in the use of RICs in the first quarter. This is likely explained by
the recess in the Brazilian legislative session in the month of January (artificially increasing
the number of zeros in the first quarter).
Table 3.2: Policy Monitoring: Identifying the Author and the Target
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Presidential Junior Partners Pres. Party Junior Party Between Partners Between Partners
Oversight Oversight to to (Pres. Party (Pres. Party
Junior Party Pres. Party Included) Not Included)
Number of RICst−1 −0.001 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Ideological Dispersion 0.444∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(Heterogeneity) (0.068) (0.030) (0.080) (0.056) (0.030) (0.039)
President’s Approval −0.013∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.008∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Inflation (log) 0.093∗ −0.121∗∗∗ 0.074 −0.247∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.052) (0.021) (0.075) (0.028) (0.020) (0.033)
First Quarter −0.064 −0.309∗∗∗ −0.443∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.558∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.042) (0.148) (0.057) (0.042) (0.070)
PSDB 1.038∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.551 1.619∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.309) (0.130) (0.367) (0.301) (0.128) (0.174)
PMDB 0.036 0.074 −0.176 0.394 −0.105 −0.160
(0.294) (0.122) (0.301) (0.314) (0.125) (0.154)
PT 1.346∗∗∗ −0.032 0.017 1.016∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.310
(0.344) (0.140) (0.409) (0.310) (0.139) (0.193)
Constant −0.347 1.670∗∗∗ −0.547 0.062 1.757∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.173) (0.475) (0.375) (0.170) (0.225)
N 92 92 92 92 92 92
Log Likelihood −409.496 −1,711.141 −269.045 −1,183.586 −1,723.526 −969.511
Akaike Inf. Crit. 836.992 3,440.283 556.090 2,385.172 3,465.052 1,957.022
Notes: Dependent variable: Number of RICs initiated per direction and per quarter.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
In sum, the results found in this study corroborate my theoretical expectation of greater
policy monitoring between coalition partners under more ideologically-heterogenous cabinets.
This finding highlights that mechanisms to solve intra-coalition conflicts in presidential sys-
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tems is neither restricted to the executive arena nor pursued only by the president to keep
tabs of her partners. In this study, I demonstrate that policy monitoring under presiden-
tial coalition governments occurs between all coalition members (junior and senior partners)
within the legislative arena. Similar to coalition governments in parliamentary systems,
this finding reinforces the idea that the expectations of informational losses resulting from
the delegation of power in multiparty systems, including presidential systems, are higher
in contexts where the policy preferences of political parties are more divergent (Lupia and
McCubbins, 1998; Martin and Vanberg, 2004, 2011; Laver, 2008; Carroll and Cox, 2012).
The results when authorship is taken into consideration reveal that junior partners have
preeminence in policy monitoring initiatives as compared to the president’s party. The re-
sults indicate that policy monitoring occurs at all levels within the coalition. Nevertheless,
the expectation of greater monitoring efforts initiated by junior partners due to the pres-
ident’s capacity to fire ministers without fear of a government breakdown was not tested
directly in this study. The full exploration of this expectation depends on the availability of
comparable policy monitoring data between parliamentary and presidential systems.
3.7 Conclusion
Similar to what happens in parliamentary systems, presidential coalition governments re-
quire a continuous effort by the cabinet members to mitigate the costs of delegating ministry
control to parties with different policy preferences. According to the argument advanced in
this study, as the distance increases between the ideological preferences of the parties that
are members of the cabinet, there is an expectation of information asymmetry and minis-
terial drift and, therefore, a greater incentive for cabinet members to oversee and monitor
the policies being implemented by their coalition partners. Moreover, the fixed-term nature
of the president’s office and the capacity of the president to fire ministers without fear of
a government breakdown leads to an expectation of greater monitoring efforts initiated by
junior partners.
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By analyzing more than 20,000 information requests made between 1991 and 2014 by
members of the Brazilian Congress to individual ministers, the results partially support my
expectations. At first, the higher incidence of RICs initiated by legislative parties without
authorship identification are present in context of higher cabinet heterogeneity. The results
indicate a greater use of the control mechanism RIC associated with the expectation of
information loss, when parties that are more ideologically distant hold portfolios within the
cabinet. Along my stated expectations, the results indicate that the the strategy of cabinet
members to oversee the implementation of policies under the responsibility of government
partners is greater under more ideologically-heterogeneous cabinets.
Looking at the directions of the RIC initiatives by members of the coalition, the expecta-
tion of increased policy monitoring initiated junior partners (in particular between coalition
partners) as compared to the president’s party is not supported. The refined measurement of
policy monitoring through the use of RICs allows the comparison of policy monitoring initia-
tives between all coalition members (junior and senior partners) within the legislative arena.
As such, it was revealed that the use of RIC as a mechanism of mutual policy implementation
monitoring between coalition partners occurs at all levels within the coalition.
Although the expectation of greater monitoring efforts initiated between and by junior
partners is not supported, using only Brazil as a case study does not allow a direct test
of this expectation based on the president’s prerogative to appoint and remove cabinet
members without the fear of a government breakdown. The availability of comparable policy
monitoring data between parliamentary and presidential systems can make full exploration
of this expectation possible.
Also, as revealed by the literature on parliamentary systems, the ability to police the
partners of the coalition consists of monitoring and correcting ministerial drift. In this
study, I focus only on the first of these tasks, i.e., the policy monitoring initiatives. The
correction of the policies is a topic worthy of further exploration. Coalition partners can
potentially use the monitoring process analyzed in this study to scrutinize and amend, for
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example, bill proposals they believe represent unacceptable drift.
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4. HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL COALITION TERMINATION
4.1 Introduction
Despite the large body of research on the legislative performance of coalition govern-
ments in presidential systems (particularly in Latin American democracies) (Figueiredo and
Limongi, 1999; Lanzaro, 2001; Amorim Neto, 2006a; Figueiredo, Salles, and Vieira, 2009),
empirical and comparative analyses on coalition survival in presidential systems remain scant,
and important questions remain unanswered: Why don’t coalitions last the entire presiden-
tial term? How long will coalition cabinets last in presidential systems? Whether and under
what conditions are cabinet terminations more likely to happen in presidential systems?
In this study, I am particularly interested in understanding the effects of exogenous ran-
dom shocks (critical events) on coalition termination in presidential systems. The distinction
between causes of coalition termination due to structural attributes of the political regime or
of the coalition itself, or due to exogenous critical events, corresponds to the most-important
explanatory variables highlighted by the literature on coalition termination in parliamentary
systems (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber, 1984, 1986; Strøm et al., 1988; King et al., 1990;
Warwick, 1992, 1994; Lupia and Strøm, 1995a; Diermeier and Stevenson, 2000). Besides
structural attributes and critical event factors, the timing of the electoral calendar in presi-
dential systems might have an important role in coalition termination in presidential systems
and must not be ignored. Different from parliamentary systems, in presidential systems the
timing of the next election for the chief executive is fixed.
I propose a theoretical framework in which I adapt elements from the extensive literature
on cabinet survival in parliamentary systems to the context and specificities of presidential
systems. Based on the exclusive powers of the president to form and reshuffle cabinets and
the central position of the president within coalition governments, I argue that economic
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indicators—such as inflation, unemployment, economic growth—and the public’s approval
rating of the president’s performance to be crucial factors that predict cabinet termination
in presidential democracies.
By conducting an event history analysis in a longitudinal dataset from 1978 to 2007
that includes 10 democracies in Latin America, the results in this study show that inflation,
unemployment, and fragmentation within the coalition and the party system are the main
predictors of cabinet termination. These findings reveal that presidential coalitions terminate
for reasons similar to those that can lead to parliamentary coalition termination.
This paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I present a review of the literature
on coalition termination.1 This review is heavily based on the literature on parliamentary
systems. This literature is then contrasted to the specificities of presidential systems. In
section 3, I present my theory, and, based on the theoretical model proposed, I suggest four
empirical implications. In section 4, I present the data and the variables used in this study
and discuss the method to empirically test the hypotheses. In section 5, I discuss the results
of this study, and in section 6, I present my final comments.
4.2 Why Would Coalitions Be Unstable in Presidential Democracies?
According to previous studies on presidential systems, coalition governments should either
be rare, due to “the perils of presidentialism” (Linz, 1990), or unstable, due to difficult
institutional combinations (Mainwaring, 1993). Another suggested factor leading to greater
instability of coalition governments in presidential systems concerns the fixed nature of the
electoral calendar in these systems, in what became known as the “tyranny of the electoral
calendar” (Altman, 2000b,a).
Linz (1990; 1994) suggests that presidential systems have structural problems such as
the dual legitimacy of the executive and legislative branches, the increased likelihood of
1In this study, as I am using the term “coalition” and “cabinet coalition” interchangeably, I also use
“coalition termination” and “cabinet termination” interchangeably.
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inter-branch conflict, and the lack of an institutional mechanism to resolve these conflicts.
The “difficult combination” hypothesis (Mainwaring, 1993) implies that inter-branch conflict
and the legislature’s non-cooperative behavior would be aggravated by the combination of a
strong president with a multiparty system. The “tyranny of the electoral calendar” hypothesis
(Altman, 2000a), in turn, suggests that as new elections approach, members of the coalition
will try to distance themselves from the president in order to avoid paying the costs associated
with the government’s unpopular policies. Therefore, because the coalition’s parties would
fare better by competing in elections alone, they would abandon the government before the
end of the presidential term (Chasquetti, 1999; Altman, 2000b,a).
Studies comparing parliamentary and presidential systems (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002;
Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004) suggest that the same incentives for coalition for-
mation are present in both systems of government. Empirical studies on Latin American
democracies (Deheza, 1998; Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999; Amorim Neto, 2000, 2006a; Chas-
quetti, 1999; Lanzaro, 2001; Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011), that focus on the largest number
of countries in the world in which presidential systems coexist with multiparty systems, have
revealed that coalition governments have been the most frequent and effective way to address
and resolve the president’s problem of legislative minority support. Therefore, coalition gov-
ernment should not be considered a rare phenomenon in presidential systems (Cheibub and
Limongi, 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004; Cheibub, 2007; Figueiredo, Salles, and
Vieira 2009).
Nevertheless, the analysis on Latin American presidential democracies are mostly descrip-
tive case studies concerned with either demonstrating that coalition governments are not rare
in the region, or evaluating the legislative success of coalition governments within presiden-
tial systems. Such examples can be seen in studies on Brazil (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999),
Uruguay (Chasquetti, 1999), Chile (Siavelis, 2000), Argentina (Novaro, 2001), and Bolivia
(Mayorga, 2001). In contrast to the extensive literature on parliamentary systems (Strøm,
1984; Strøm et al., 1988; Schofield and Laver, 1985; Laver and Shepsle, 1990, 1994; Lupia
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and Strøm, 1995b; Grofman and van Roozendaal, 1997; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008),
theoretical models and empirical comparative analysis on cabinet survival in presidential
systems remain underdeveloped.2
A study on cabinet termination can take cues from the extensive literature regarding
cabinet survival and termination under parliamentary systems. This literature considers
bargaining environment complexity (Laver and Shepsle, 1990; Alt and King, 1994), ideologi-
cal diversity and polarization (Warwick, 1992, 1994), external environments such as economic
conditions (Robertson, 1983a,b, 1984; Warwick, 1992; Narud, 1995), strategic timing of elec-
tions and calculus of alternative coalitions (Grofman and van Roozendaal, 1994; Lupia and
Strøm, 1995b), strategies to reduce the prime minister’s agency loss (Indridason and Kam,
2008), and structural attributes of the coalition itself such as the size and number of political
parties (Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2008; Bergman, Ersson, and Hellström, 2015).
In any case, some of the theories developed for parliamentary coalition termination are
clearly not applicable to presidential contexts. Different from parliamentary democracies,
presidential democracies are defined by the mutual independence between the executive
and the legislative branches (Lijphart, 1992; Stepan and Skach, 1993), the fixed electoral
calendar, and the absence of certain institutional attributes such as investiture and the vote
of no confidence procedure.
The hypothesis of “the tyranny of the electoral calendar” is directly related to the speci-
ficities of the presidential systems, particularly regarding presidential and legislative fixed
terms. The term “tyranny of the electoral calendar” was coined by Altman (2000b), but the
expectation is similar in all cited studies: as the next election approaches, parties have fewer
2An important exception is Martínez-Gallardo (2012). Focusing on structural attributes, Martínez-
Gallardo (2012) reveals that presidential coalitions are not as short-lived and ad hoc as compared to parlia-
mentary coalitions, and demonstrates that the stability of presidential coalitions depends on the balance of
institutional and political power between the president and the legislature. Strong presidents (with greater
unilateral presidential authority), will have a lower cost of losing the support of coalition partners. Conse-
quently, strong presidents will have weaker incentives to reach agreement with coalition partners, leading to
an increase in the likelihood of a coalition breakdown. Yet, a strong legislature counterbalances this effect,
increasing the presidents incentives to compromise with parties in exchange of their legislative support, and,
consequently, leading to more durable coalitions.
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incentives to join or remain in the government, and therefore cabinet termination should
be more likely, given the impending elections (Chasquetti, 1999; Altman, 2000b; Alemán
and Tsebelis, 2011). Although Altman considers that other covariates—such as economic
and ideological factors—can affect cabinet duration, the author sustains that “nonetheless,
whether a party remains in the executive coalition is subject to the tyranny of the electoral
calendar” (Altman, 2000b, p. 19). Thus, at the end of the president’s term, members of the
coalition would mainly be concerned with electoral gains and would behave as office- and
vote-seeking actors (Altman, 2000a, p. 268).
The rationale behind “the tyranny of the electoral calendar” is that members of the
coalition should try to distance themselves from the president in order to avoid paying the
costs of being associated with the incumbent government. The proximity of the elections,
then, should create strong incentives for members of the coalition to leave the cabinet, unless
the country’s economy is performing well.
In this paper, I challenge hypotheses such as the “tyranny of the electoral calendar” and
argue that the privileged position of the president within the coalition (i.e., the central fig-
ure within the cabinet), and her power to freely select and remove ministers without fear
of a government breakdown, makes the evaluation of the president’s performance and other
critical events crucial elements in the parties’ calculus regarding whether or not to stay in
the government.
4.3 Theory and Hypotheses
Presidents have some exclusive powers on coalition formation and the dynamics of min-
isterial reshuffling in presidential systems, which are: 1. Constitutional prerogative pow-
ers to form and reshuffle the government’s cabinet (Amorim Neto, 2000; Figueiredo, 2007;
Araújo, Silva, and Vieira, 2016); 2. Exclusivity as the formateur in the coalition’s forma-
tion (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Silva, 2016), and; 3. Constitutionally-fixed
terms, remaining in power even under adverse legislative conditions (Shugart and Carey,
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1992; Mainwaring, 1993; Altman, 2000a; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004; Cheibub,
2007).
Hypotheses such as the “tyranny of the electoral calendar” neglect the central position
of the president in the government formation process (as the exclusive formateur) and her
capacity to remove ministers without fear of a government breakdown. Presidents can fire
ministers from junior parties that don’t deliver legislative votes. The fact that the president’s
tenure is immediately not threatened when she withdraws portfolios from junior parties, gives
credibility to the junior parties’ pledge to support the president’s legislative agenda. Also,
presidents usually control important resources of interest to legislators (e.g., patronage and
budget) (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Figueiredo and Limongi,
1999; Raile, Pereira, and Power, 2011). The president’s control over these resources puts the
president in a favorable position to bargain for cooperation from legislators.
Moreover, there is a possibility that parties’ identification with a highly-evaluated gov-
ernment can bring electoral benefit for the members of the coalition. There is no reason to
believe that only under presidential systems would being part of the government yield no
electoral benefits for junior parties when the economy is performing well and the president
is popular with voters. There is evidence that the decision to join the government involves a
cost-benefit evaluation between possible electoral losses and the potential to be part of the
coalition (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Freitas, 2013; Araújo, Freitas, and Vieira, 2018).
Therefore, in this paper I suggest a theory in which the termination of coalition gov-
ernments depends on critical events directly related to government’s performance, such as
economic conditions—inflation, unemployment, and economic growth—and the approval rat-
ing of the president. The argument is that the exclusive powers of the president to form
and reshuffle cabinets and the central position of the president within the coalition make
the evaluation of the president’s approval rating and other critical events crucial elements in
the junior partners’ decision of whether or not to remain in the government. The changes
in government tied to these factors are due to political and electoral reasons, similar to the
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reasons that lead to parliamentary coalition termination.
Following the theory stated above, four empirical implications are tested in this study.
As the country’s inflation rate increases, a shorter duration of the coalition is expected. As
the country’s unemployment rate increases, a shorter duration of the coalition is expected.
As the presidential approval rate increases, a longer duration of the coalition is expected. As
the country’s GDP growth increases, a longer duration of the coalition is expected. These
factors will interact with the elapsing of the president’s term, to capture the role of the
electoral calendar on presidential systems. The proximity of the elections should create in-
centives for members of the coalition to leave the cabinet, unless the country’s economy is
performing well and the president is popular.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
The dataset used in this study comprises 82 cabinet coalitions formed from 1978 to
2007, and was built from political data provided by Amorim Neto, updated with data from
the Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP), and supplemented with economic
data from The World Bank and the Executive Approval Project (EAP).3 The unit of analysis
in this study is each coalition per country, comprising a total of 82 observations.
In order to model the likelihood of coalition termination, in this study I will conduct
an event-history analysis (Cox and Oakes, 1984; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) using a
dataset that is comprised of data from 10 Latin American democracies, from 1978 to 2007.4
The justification for the use of these cases is based on data availability, and on definitions
for three main concepts of the analysis: democracy, presidential systems, and coalition gov-
ernment.
3The complete data source can be viewed in Table C.1 of the Appendix C. Summary statistics can be
viewed in Table C.2 of the same supplementary material.
4The presidential systems and the time range included are: Argentina (1989-2001), Bolivia (1982-2001),
Brazil (1985-2007), Chile (1990-2004), Colombia (1978-2000), Ecuador (1979-1999), Panama (1990-2002),
Peru (1980-1991), Uruguay (1985-2003), and Venezuela (1992-1999).
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4.4.1 Concepts: Democracy, Presidential System, and Coalition Government
For the classification of a democratic regime, I use the definition suggested by Przeworski,
Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), which was further developed by Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland (2010, p. 69):
1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself
popularly elected;
2. The legislature must be popularly elected;
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections; and
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the
incumbent to office must have taken place.
This classification has the advantages of being comprehensive for classifying worldwide
political regimes in a minimalist way related to the research question addressed in this study
(Collier and Adcock, 1999). This classification is also strongly correlated with other common
measures of democracy such as those developed by the Freedom House and the Polity IV
Project.
Presidential systems are defined according to the concept developed by Shugart and
Carey (1992, p. 19-20):
1. The chief executive is elected by popular vote or by a body that was itself popularly
elected;
2. The terms of the chief executive and the assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on
mutual confidence;
3. The chief executive selects and removes the members of the cabinet; and
4. The chief executive has some constitutionally-granted lawmaking authority, such as
veto power.
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For coalition governments, I adopt a minimalist definition: a coalition government is
present when at least two parties hold cabinet portfolios. To define the demarcation of the
end of a cabinet, I adopt the standard definition in the literature on parliamentary and presi-
dential systems of government: Any changes in the set of parties holding cabinet membership.
4.4.2 Dependent Variable
Coalition Survival. The dependent variable is the durability of the coalitions, as measured
by the number of days that the coalition survived. Each of the coalitions in the sample has
the number of days it lasted. As an example, since its recent democratization in 1990 to
the last data available in 2004, Chile has had five different coalitions. The first Chilean
coalition, during the presidency of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), lasted 934 days (that is, the
difference between the end date and the start date of the coalition). The same operation was
conducted for each coalition in every country included in the analysis. The average duration
of the coalitions in the sample is 585.39 days, with a standard deviation of 483.18 days.
The less durable coalition, with only 30 days, started in June 1986 and was the second
coalition formed by Ecuadorian President León Febres Cordero. The most enduring coalitions
lasted 1826 days: the first coalition formed by Uruguayan President Luis Alberto Lacalle,
which started in March 1990, and the first coalition formed in the second term of Venezuelan
President Rafael Caldera, which started in February 1994.
4.4.3 Independent Variables
Inflation. This variable is a measurement of the consumer price index (CPI), reflecting
the quarterly percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket
of goods and services. In the sample, this variable has a mean value of 22.71 percent, with
a standard deviation of 43.45 percent. The minimum value of the sample is a deflation of
-0.58 (Bolivia in the first quarter of 2001) and the maximum value is 204.54 (Peru in the last
quarter of 1988). The period of hyperinflation in Latin America (from 1985 to 1995) presents
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disproportionate values for this variable, making the distribution of the variable extremely
skewed. For this reason, the variable inflation was log transformed.5
Unemployment. This variable refers to the quarterly share (percentage) of the labor force
that is without work but available for and seeking employment. The average unemployment
rate among the countries included in this analysis is 9.29 percent, with a standard deviation
of 3.56 percent. The lowest unemployment rate in the sample is 3.40 (Brazil in the last
quarter of 1989), and the highest value is 19.82 (Panama in the first quarter of 1983).
GDP Growth. Annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) at market
prices, based on constant U.S. dollars from 2005. The mean value of this variable in the
sample is 2.69 percent, with a standard deviation of 4.31 percent. The variable ranges from
a minimum value of -11.70 (Peru in 1990) to a maximum value of 11.94 (Argentina in 1992).
President’s Approval Rating. This variable measures the presidential job approval based
on country-specific surveys that included the question, “Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that [name of the chief executive] is handling his/her job as [title of executive
position]?” The mean value of this variable is 43.30 percent, with a standard deviation of
11.91 percent. The least-popular president in the sample is the Peruvian President Fernando
Belaúnde Terry in 1984 (14.93 percent), and the most-popular president in the sample is the
Colombian President César Gaviria Trujillo in 1992 (69.60 percent). As presidential approval
rating can act as a function of the economic variables, new variables that interact with the
president’s approval rating and each of the economic factors were also created.
Cycle. This variable measures the elapsing of the president’s term, expressed as 1− Te−Tca
Tco
.
Where Te is the year the president’s term ends, Tca is the current year of the president’s term
according to the cabinet i, and Tco is the fixed number of years of the president’s term as
defined by the country’s constitution. The measurement of this variable in this fashion
controls for different presidential terms across countries. As an example of a presidential
term of four years, a value of 0.25 refers to the first year of the president’s term, 0.5 is the
5The distributions of the variables—including the distribution for the log transformed inflation—can be
viewed in Appendix D of the Appendix Material.
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second year, 0.75 is the third year, and 1 refers to the last year of the president’s term.
As mentioned before, an important part of the literature on coalition termination suggests
that as a new election approaches, the likelihood of a cabinet termination will be greater
(Altman, 2000b,a). Chasquetti (1999) states that the fixed terms of the president, vice-
president and legislature seem to be decisive for the duration and stability of cabinets,
because parties that compose the coalition are fully aware of the electoral calendar, and
thus maintaining a coalition should be a function of the temporal distance of the national
election (Altman, 2000a, p. 278n1). Therefore, according to the hypothesis of the “tyranny
of the electoral calendar,” it is expected that the more advanced the presidential term (in a
temporal sense), the higher the likelihood of a cabinet termination.
Size of the Coalition. This variable refers to the number of parties represented in the
cabinet. In the sample, this variable has a mean of 3.5 parties composing the coalition,
with a standard deviation of 1.62 parties. The smallest coalitions in the sample are those
formed by only two parties (26 observations), and the three biggest coalitions are composed
of eight parties—the first (2003) and second (2004) coalitions formed in the first term of the
Brazilian President Lula da Silva, and the first coalition (2007) formed by Lula da Silva in
his second term.
Studies on parliamentary systems found that the number of parties in the cabinet has
a significant and negative impact on cabinet durability (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Sanders
and Herman, 1977). By considering that more parties in the cabinet can lead to more
conflict within the coalition among the governing parties, the same outcome is expected in
presidential systems: as the number of parties in the cabinet increases, the likelihood of a
cabinet’s termination will also increase.
Ideological Dispersion. This variable measures the ideological heterogeneity of the cabi-
nets or polarization, i.e. the ideological distance between the furthest-left party represented
in the cabinet to the furthest-right party represented in the cabinet. Following Coppedge
(1997), Saez and Freidenberg (2001) and Neto (2006a), each governing party was assigned
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to a numeric value (from -1 to 1) in a left-right ideological continuum: Left = -1; center-left
= -0.5; center = 0; center-right = 0.5, and; right = 1. Thus, the ideological dispersion of the
cabinet can be expressed as |Pfl−Pfr|, where Pfl is the ideological position on the left-right
continuum of the furthest-left party represented in the cabinet, and Pfr is the ideological po-
sition on the left-right continuum of the furthest-right party represented in the cabinet. The
variable thus ranges from 0—absence of ideological heterogeneity (that is, an ideologically
homogeneous cabinet)—to 2—maximum ideological heterogeneity.
In the sample, there are 16 homogeneous cabinets, and nine observations with the maxi-
mum heterogeneity value. Ideologically homogeneous cabinets are less vulnerable to conflict
and disagreements over policy choices. In other words, the conflict of interests within the
coalition intensifies as the ideological dispersion of the cabinet increases, which therefore
increases the polarization of the cabinet. Thus, I expect that the higher the ideological
dispersion, the higher the likelihood of a cabinet termination.
Cabinet Coalescence. One of the factors suggested by the literature in explaining the
durability of cabinets in presidential systems is the deviation from the proportionality be-
tween the number of ministries held by the governing parties and the number of legislative
seats these parties contribute to the coalition (Amorim Neto, 2006a). In the first chapter of
this dissertation, I also reveal a substantial variation in the proportionality of presidential
cabinets, and that this variation is a consequence of how dependent the president is upon
the legislature. In this study, I use the cabinet coalescence rate suggested by Neto (2006a;
2006b) to measure the proportionality of portfolio allocation at the level of coalition, that
can be expressed as:
Coalescence = 1−
∑n
i=1(|si − pi|)
2
Where si= the percentage of legislative seats governing party i contributes to the coalition
when the cabinet is appointed, and; pi = the proportion of portfolios governing party i
receives from the total of available portfolios. The coalescence rate varies between 0—no
correspondence between cabinet shares and legislative seats—and 1—perfect correspondence
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between the portfolio share and the contribution of legislative seat share to the coalition by
coalition partners.
According to Neto (2000), the more proportional the distribution of portfolios among
the coalition’s members—based on their legislative strength—the higher is the legislative
discipline of these members. Thus, it is expected that the greater the cabinet coalescence,
the less likely is a cabinet termination. This expectation is intuitive, since if the government
is receiving support from the parties that comprise the coalition, there is no incentive, ceteris
paribus, for the president to change the cabinet.
Effective Number of Parties (ENP). This variable is Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979)
measurement of the fragmentation of the party system in the legislative branch. That is,
ENP = 1∑n
i=1 s
2
i
, where si is the percentage of legislative seats the governing party i holds
when the cabinet is appointed. The mean value for this variable in the sample is 5.36 parties,
with a standard deviation of 2.27 parties. The least-fragmented party system is Colombia’s
in 1986 (ENP = 1.98), and the most-fragmented party systems is Brazil’s between 1992
and 1993 (ENP = 9.34). According to Chasquetti (2001), an extremely fragmented system
(ENP > 4) should be more problematic for government stability in presidential systems
due to higher coordination problems among coalition partners and increased intra-coalition
conflicts. Thus, I expect that the higher the legislative fractionalization, the higher the like-
lihood of a cabinet termination.
4.4.4 Method: The Cox Proportional Hazards Model
When the duration of the presidential cabinets—measured by the number of days the
cabinet lasts until it terminates—is used as the dependent variable, traditional regression
techniques such as OLS-type should be avoided (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). First,
because the dependent variable is the duration, it cannot assume negative values. The
time to failure or the time to the termination of the event is thus always positive. But more
importantly, the problem with using OLS to analyze event history data lies with the assumed
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distribution of the residuals. In linear regression, the residuals are assumed to be distributed
normally, but the assumption of normality of time to an event may be unreasonable. It
is unreasonable, for instance, if we are thinking about an event that has a likelihood of
terminating instantaneously that is constant over time. In that case, the distribution of time
would follow an exponential distribution.
In this sense, a common approach to estimate duration models is to assume a probability
distribution function for the duration of the event—for example, a Weibull, an exponential,
or a logistic distribution—and estimate the probability for the duration with the method of
maximum likelihood. King, Alt, Burns and Laver (1990) and Warwick (1992), for instance,
used parametric methods to understand coalition durations in parliamentary systems. Both
studies had strong theoretical expectations regarding the distribution of the residuals. The
downside of this approach is that the results are sensitive to the chosen distribution function,
and if the distribution of failure times is parameterized incorrectly, then the interpretations
afforded by parametric models could be misleading and may not make substantive sense
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
The theory developed in this study is focused on the relationship between the cabinet du-
ration and independent variables that vary over time. Thus, in order to estimate the model
of cabinet duration, I use the Cox proportional hazards model with time-varying covariates
(Cox, 1972; Cox and Oakes, 1984; Fisher and Lin, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004;
Martinussen and Scheike, 2006; Thomas and Reyes, 2014). The advantage of this approach
is that we can leave the particular distribution form for the duration dependency unspeci-
fied,6 which has been shown to be preferable on both substantive and statistical grounds for
parametric models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, p. 48).7
6The Cox model is considered a “semi-parametric” model. As described by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
(2004, p. 49), “the (ordered) duration times are parameterized in terms of a set of covariates, but the
particular distributional form of the duration times is not parameterized.”
7The Cox model is also preferred for dealing with right-censoring data—subjects that we do not or cannot
observe long enough for all of them to fail. In the sample data I am using, however, there is no censoring; the
full duration time of cabinets is observed. Nevertheless, left-truncation could be present in the data when
history prior to the first observed cabinet in a country is unobserved. The fact that only Latin American
presidential systems are included in this study minimizes this problem, because the first observation for each
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4.5 Results and Discussion
In interpreting the coefficients of a Cox proportional hazards model, the dependent vari-
able is the hazard rate of the duration of the cabinet. In other words, the hazard rate refers
to the likelihood that a cabinet will terminate at a particular point in time, given that it
has not yet fallen. Therefore, higher hazard rates—positive estimate coefficients—represent
a higher likelihood of failure and, consequently, a shorter duration of the cabinet. Negative
estimate coefficients, in turn, represent a reduction in the likelihood of termination, and
consequently, a longer duration of the cabinet.
Table 4.1 presents estimate coefficients for four Cox regression models. Due to 10 missing
values in the independent variable “presidential approval rate,” in the first model I decided
to remove this variable to keep all sample observations. The second model is the full model.
Latin American presidential systems are politically and socially diversified, and thus gen-
eralizing the region’s governments can lead to unreliable results. To control for country
specificities, I also present the estimates for the first model with country fixed-effects (Model
3) and for the second model with country fixed-effects (Model 4). To echo Schofield and
Laver’s argument (1985, p. 143) for the parliamentary context, “differences between coun-
tries are at least as significant as those between theories.”8
By exponentiating Cox estimates from Table 4.1, the coefficients turn into the metric
of hazard ratios, and with this we can make substantive inferences. Table 4.1 presents the
results in terms of the hazard ratio italics. As such, hazard ratios greater than 1 imply that
the likelihood (or hazard) of coalition termination increases as the value of the independent
variable increases, thus resulting in a greater likelihood of failure (shorter coalition duration).
Hazard ratios smaller than 1, in turn, imply that the likelihood (or hazard) of coalition
country in the dataset is usually the first cabinet formed in the current democratic era of the country (any
coalition formed in country’s non-democratic period is not included in the analysis).
8To save space, the non-significant results for the fixed-effects terms for countries were omitted from Table
1. The results for these terms can be viewed in Appendix F of the Appendix Material.
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Table 4.1: Cox Model Estimates and Hazard Ratios: The Effects of Critical Events on
Presidential Coalition Duration
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient exp(coeff.) Coefficient exp(coeff.) Coefficient exp(coeff.) Coefficient exp(coeff.)
Critical Events:
Inflation (log) 0.208∗∗ 1.231 0.263∗∗ 1.301 0.204∗ 1.227 0.222∗ 1.249
(0.091) (0.119) (0.106) (0.127)
Unemployment 0.096∗ 1.101 0.108∗ 1.114 −0.038 0.963 −0.033 0.967
(0.052) (0.064) (0.081) (0.099)
GDP Growth 0.021 1.021 0.015 1.016 −0.004 0.996 −0.015 0.985
(0.032) (0.033) (0.043) (0.044)
Presidential Approval 0.006 1.006 0.009 1.009
(0.015) (0.018)
Control Variables:
Cycle −0.306 0.736 −0.184 0.832 −0.379 0.685 −0.125 0.882
(0.410) (0.456) (0.425) (0.475)
Size of the Coalition 0.111 1.117 0.078 1.081 0.393∗∗ 1.482 0.373∗ 1.452
(0.123) (0.141) (0.162) (0.194)
Coalescence 2.625 13.804 2.209 9.106 2.710 15.029 2.385 15.029
(2.138) (2.290) (2.978) (3.049)
Ideological Dispersion −0.109 0.896 −0.128 0.880 −0.070 0.933 −0.250 0.778
(0.281) (0.318) (0.417) (0.468)
Fragmentation (ENP) 0.316∗∗∗ 1.371 0.352∗∗∗ 1.422 0.450∗∗∗ 1.568 0.412∗∗ 1.510
(0.106) (0.121) (0.162) (0.164)
Brazil −2.344∗ 0.096 −2.298 0.101
(1.376) (1.413)
Chile −3.373∗ 0.034 −3.638∗ 0.026
(2.029) (2.135)
N 82 72 82 72
R2 0.402 0.398 0.543 0.534
Log Likelihood −251.667 −210.429 −239.188 −200.121
Wald Test 34.230∗∗∗ 30.560∗∗∗ 51.600∗∗∗ 44.280∗∗∗
LR Test 35.248∗∗∗ 31.522∗∗∗ 60.205∗∗∗ 52.139∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 37.429∗∗∗ 34.496∗∗∗ 61.750∗∗∗ 54.677∗∗∗
Notes: Dependent variable: Hazard ratios of cabinet duration in days = exp(coefficients). Standard errors of the (non-
exponentiate) coefficients in parenthesis: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Two-tailed test. Statistically significant estimates are
in bold.
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termination decreases as the value of the independent variable increases, thus resulting in a
smaller likelihood of failure (longer coalition duration). In contrast, hazard ratios close to
1—as in the case of the parameters for “GDP growth” and “presidential approval”—imply
that the hazard rate is essentially invariant to changes in the independent variable, i.e. the
coefficient has no effect on increasing (or decreasing) the hazard of cabinet duration.
Figure 4.1: Hazard Ratios of Cabinet Duration by Inflation
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Note: Dashed-line at y = 1. Hazard ratios greater than 1 imply that the likelihood is increasing as the value of the independent
variable increases, thus resulting in a shorter cabinet duration. Hazard ratios smaller than 1, in turn, imply that the likelihood
of cabinet termination decreases as the value of the independent variable increases, thus resulting in a longer cabinet duration.
The plot is visually weighted, i.e. the darker areas of the graph have a higher concentration of hazard ratios simulation by the
independent variable of interest. Confidence intervals at level 0.1.
As we can see in Table 4.1, and depicted graphically in Figure 4.1, inflation is statistically
significant in all models among the main independent variables. With a positive coefficient
estimate for inflation, as the value for inflation increases, the hazard rate increases, thus
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decreasing the duration of the coalition. Substantively, as inflation increases by one unit,
holding the other variables constant, the likelihood of a cabinet termination increases to
almost 25 percent in Models 1, 2, and 3, and by 30 percent in the model with random effects
including presidential approval (Model 2). This result supports the first hypothesis of this
study, according to which as the country’s inflation rate increases, a shorter duration of the
cabinet is expected.
Figure 4.2: Hazard Ratios of Cabinet Duration by Unemployment
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Note: Dashed-line at y = 1. Hazard ratios greater than 1 imply that the likelihood is increasing as the value of the independent
variable increases, thus resulting in a shorter cabinet duration. Hazard ratios smaller than 1, in turn, imply that the likelihood
of cabinet termination decreases as the value of the independent variable increases, thus resulting in a longer cabinet duration.
The plot is visually weighted, i.e. the darker areas of the graph have a higher concentration of hazard ratios simulation by the
independent variable of interest. Confidence intervals at level 0.1.
The second hypothesis—as the country’s unemployment rate increases, a shorter du-
ration of the cabinet is expected—is partially supported by the results. The estimate for
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unemployment is positive and statistically significant in the random-effects models (Model
1 and Model 2) (see Figure 4.2 above). Substantively, as the unemployment rate increases
by one percent, holding the other variables constant, the likelihood of a cabinet termination
increases by close to 10 percent.
Although hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by the results of this study, hypotheses 3
and 4 are not. “GDP growth” and “presidential approval” are not statistically significant in
any model, and their hazard ratios are close to 1, implying no effect on cabinet duration,
holding all other variables constant. This is an interesting finding and may indicate that in
their calculus of whether or not to stay in the government, the governing parties are more
attentive to factors that affect their voters directly, such as inflation and unemployment. The
results for the economic indicators reveal that the termination of coalition follows a logic
that fits a rational behavior of the coalition’s members. When the government is successful
in controlling inflation and unemployment, cabinet termination becomes less likely.
It is also noteworthy that the results do not support the “tyranny of the electoral calendar”
hypothesis. Holding all other variables constant, an increase in the independent variable
“cycle”—meaning that a new election is closer—results in a estimate that is not statistically
significant and in the opposite direction expected by the “tyranny of the electoral calendar”
hypothesis. According to the theory proposed in this study, these results go in favor of
the expected outcomes. That is, when the model specified includes critical events such as
economic indicators, no relationship between the elapsing of the president’s term and the
cabinet termination is found.
The estimates for the “size of the coalition” and the “effective number of parties (ENP)”
are the only statistically significant variables among the variables controlling for the struc-
tural factors of the coalition itself and the party system. This indicates that both the
fragmentation within the coalition and the fragmentation of the party systems are—along
with inflation and unemployment—strong predictors of cabinet termination.
The results for the multiplicative interaction models can be seen in Table C.10 of the
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Appendix C.9. The estimates for the interactive terms between critical events factors and
the elapsing of the president’s term (“cycles”) are not statistically significant, holding all
other variables constant. These results indicate that the exogenous critical events “inflation”
and “unemployment” are crucial for presidential coalition termination regardless of how close
is the next election.
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, I proposed a theoretical framework in which I adapt elements from the
literature on cabinet survival in parliamentary systems to the context and specificities of
presidential systems. Considering the exclusive powers of the president to form and reshuf-
fle cabinets and her central position within coalitions, I suggested that the termination of
a cabinet in presidential systems depends on exogenous critical events such as economic
conditions—inflation, unemployment, and economic growth—and the approval ratings of
the president.
The results of this study partially support the hypotheses tested. Among the exogenous
critical events factors, inflation and unemployment rates were found to have an effect on cab-
inet breakdown. As the country’s inflation and unemployment rates increase, the duration
of the cabinet decreases. Nevertheless, the effect of unemployment was found only for the
random-effects models, suggesting that this effect may actually be nested in countries’ speci-
ficities, particularly for Brazil and Chile.9 The results also show that, among the structural
factors, the fragmentation within the cabinet and the party system are strong predictors of
cabinet termination.
These results are similar to some findings regarding parliamentary systems and reveal
that the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems of government, therefore,
is one of degree.. Warwick (1992), for example, investigated the linkage between the trends
of economic indicators and government survival in 16 European parliamentary systems and
9See the results with country fixed-effects in Figure C.6 in Appendix F.
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found that both inflation and unemployment are important explanatory factors for cabinet
termination. Saalfeld (2008) and Bergman (2015) also found that in parliamentary systems,
cabinets facing unfavorable macroeconomic situations have an increased risk of breakdown.
Also, the polarization and fractionalization of the party system were seen to be important
factors for cabinet stability in parliamentary studies (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver 1990;
Laver and Shepsle, 1990; Warwick, 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). According to
these studies, the more ideologically diversified and fractionalized the party system, the
higher the likelihood of early cabinet terminations (Laver and Shepsle, 1990).
The issue examined in this study has broader impacts beyond Latin America, partic-
ularly in new presidential democracies outside the Americas, including South Korea, the
Philippines, and several countries in Africa. The availability of new data will make it pos-
sible to test the theory proposed here in a broader comparative perspective. As new data
become available, other exogenous shocks that can affect cabinet termination but could not
be considered in this study can also enter into the analysis, such as the effects of corruption
and political scandals. These are factors that can enhance our understanding on presidential
coalition termination, a topic that has only recently begun to receive more attention.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Scholars recently identified that coalition formation is more common in presidential sys-
tems than previously assumed. However, few studies have analyzed the dynamics of coali-
tions in presidential democracies. In this dissertation, I addressed these dynamics, which
include government formation, government breakdown, and policy monitoring between coali-
tion partners. The main contribution of my dissertation lays in developing theories to under-
stand how coalitions in presidential systems are formed, how they govern, and why they die.
My answers to these questions provide important insights into the fundamental differences
between presidential and parliamentary forms of government.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I demonstrate that the institutional arrange-
ments that define the balance of power between the president and the legislature explain the
variation in the advantage of the president’s party with regards to the allocation of minis-
terial posts. Empirical analyses using new data on presidential coalitions formed between
1959 and 2017 across presidential democracies around the world reveal that the balance of
power in presidential cabinets can reflect the balance of power in the legislature when the
head of government is more dependent on the legislature to legislate. The dependence of the
president on the legislature should be viewed as a continuous variable that varies with the
president’s ability to make policy in or out of the legislature.
Building on the literature on the principal-agent problem, in the third chapter of my
dissertation I explore intra-coalition conflicts in presidential democracies. Similar to par-
liamentary systems, I demonstrate that coalition partners in presidential democracies keep
tabs on one another when the ideological distance between them is greater. The refined mea-
surement of policy monitoring through the use of RICs revealed that policy implementation
monitoring between coalition partners occurs at all levels within the coalition and is not
restricted to the executive arena. I also theorize that because presidents have access to other
tools to rein in the opportunistic behavior of coalition members, presidential parties should
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initiate less policy monitoring actions than junior partners. Although the latter expectation
was not supported, a better test of this expectation depends on the availability of data on
comparable policy monitoring between parliamentary and presidential systems.
In the third chapter of my dissertation, I provide answers to the question, “Under what
conditions are coalition terminations more likely to occur in presidential systems?” Based on
the exclusive powers of the president to form and reshuffle cabinets and the central position
of the president within coalition governments, I argue that economic indicators and the pub-
lic’s evaluation of the president’s job to be crucial factors to predict cabinet termination. By
examining 82 cabinets from 1978 to 2007 in 10 Latin American democracies, I found that in-
flation, unemployment, and the fragmentation within the coalition and the party system are
the main predictors of cabinet breakdown. These findings reveal that presidential coalitions
terminate for political and economic reasons similar to those that can lead to parliamentary
coalition termination. The difference between the two systems of government, therefore, is
one of degree.
5.1 Future Research
Currently, the majority of countries considered to be democracies have a presidential sys-
tem. Approximately 46 percent of these countries are presidential democracies, 13 percent
are semi-presidential democracies, and 41 percent are parliamentary democracies (Freedom
House, 2017). The cases included in the analyses of this dissertation were justified on the
conceptual definition of presidential multiparty democracies, the presence of coalition govern-
ments, and on data availability. Therefore, the empirical analyses of this dissertation focused
primarily on Latin American democracies. Presidential constitutions have been adopted in
most of the Latin American countries, and it has endured since the late 1980s. Nevertheless,
the theories developed in this dissertation are not restricted to Latin American cases. The
availability of new data will eventually make it possible to include more cases—beyond Latin
American democracies—to the analyses and to test the theory proposed here in a broader
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comparative perspective. In expanding the cross-country data in the future, the findings
of this dissertation could reveal broader impacts beyond Latin America, especially in other
presidential democracies outside the Americas such as Africa.
This dissertation can also serve as the base for the development of new theories arising
from the empirical findings of this study. In Chapter 2, I focused on the distribution of
portfolios during the government formation process. Other resources (beyond portfolios)
distributed by the president in the government formation process can also be explored.
Presidents have other political goods to distribute, such as state-owned enterprises, partisan
political appointments, and pork-barrel resources. By considering that presidents have other
goods to distribute that are of interest to coalition members, we might find that different
parties have different “prices,” revealing that presidents don’t buy all coalition members so
easily. A related potential study to be developed would address the consequences if resources
beyond portfolios are intrinsic to presidential constitutions, or if they are also available to
prime ministers.
Building on the findings discussed in Chapter 4 on coalition termination, another po-
tential subject for exploration is how recurring ministerial terminations by the president
can affect the president’s policy goals and policy-making capacities. Some of the potential
questions to be answered on this topic are: Does cabinet duration influence the legislative
success of presidents? Do different cabinet compositions and duration affect the economic
retrospective voting? Do the proportionality or duration of presidential coalitions affect the
president’s policy capacity? How are governing coalitions and their duration affected by the
electoral calendar in presidential and parliamentary systems?
This dissertation furthers our understanding of the relationship between the executive
and legislature in parliamentary and presidential systems, and opens many other avenues for
future research on the topic of coalition governments in presidential systems.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Cases
Table A.1: Countries, Years, and Number of Observations (n)
Country Name Year Range n
Argentina 1989–1996 8
Argentina 2016–2017 2
Bolivia 1985 1
Bolivia 1989–2003 15
Brazil 1988–2017 30
Chile 1990–2017 28
Colombia 1991–2001 11
Colombia 2010–2017 8
Ecuador 1981–1987 7
Ecuador 1992–1997 6
Ecuador 2000–2002 3
El Salvador 2009–2013 5
Honduras 2010-2013 4
Panama 1990–2000 11
Panama 2009–2017 9
Paraguay 2011-2012 2
Peru 2001–2010 10
Uruguay 1972 1
Uruguay 1985–1993 9
Uruguay 1995–2004 10
Venezuela 1959–1967 9
Venezuela 1999 1
Total: 187
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Table A.2: Countries, and Formateur Parties
Country Name Formateur’s Party
Argentina “PJ,” “PRO”
Bolivia “ADN,” “MIR,” “MNR”
Brazil “PMDB,” “PSD,” “PSDB,” “PT,” “PTB”
Chile “PDC,” “PPD,” “PRN," “PS”
Colombia “CONS,” “LIB,” “PdelaU”
Ecuador “DP,” “DPUDC,” “PRE,” “PSC,” “PUR”
El Salvador “FMNL”
Honduras “PN”
Paraguay “PLRA”
Panama “CD,” “PA,” “PP,” “PRD”
Peru “AP,” “APRA,” “PP”
Uruguay “PC,” “PN”
Venezuela “AD,” “CD”
96
A.2 Observed Values of the President’s Portfolio Balance
Figure A.1: Distribution of the Observed Values for the President’s Portfolio Balance
97
A.3 Observed Values of the President’s Policy-Making Powers
Figure A.2: Distribution of the Observed Values for the President’s Policy-Making Powers
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A.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics and Variables
Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Dependent variable:
President’s Portfolio Balance −0.06 0.27 −0.77 0.75 187
Main independent variable:
President’s Policy-Making Powers (IPIL) 0.52 0.11 0.26 0.71 187
Independent variable disaggregated (indicators):
Decree Power 0.59 0.36 0 1 187
Initiative Stage 0.64 0.26 0.10 1 165
Constitutive Stage 0.40 0.14 0.13 0.58 178
Total Veto Power 0.44 0.24 0.12 1 187
Partial Veto Power 0.60 0.33 0 1 187
Bicameral Symmetry 0.39 0.26 0 0.80 132
Control Variables:
Electoral Year 0.22 0.41 0 1 187
Effective Number of Legislative Parties (ENPP) 4.40 2.43 1.95 13.22 187
Number of Portfolios 15.16 3.72 8 24 187
99
A.5 Robustness Checks
Table A.4: Benchmark Model: President’s Portfolio Balance within Presidential Democracies
(Model 1)
President’s Policy-Making Powers (IPIL) 0.505∗∗∗
(0.179)
Constant −0.321∗∗∗
(0.095)
N 187
R2 0.04
RMSE 0.261
Dependent variable: President’s Portfolio Balance.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Alternative Measurement of Presidential Powers:
IPIL (Montero 2009) vs PresPow (Doyle and Elgie 2014)
Dependent variable: President’s Portfolio Balance
Model 1 Model 2
(IPIL) (PresPow)
IPIL 0.505∗∗∗
(0.177)
PresPow 0.464∗∗
(0.215)
Constant -0.321∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.093)
N 187 185
R2 0.042 0.025
RMSE 0.261 0.265
Notes: Dependent variable: President’s Portfolio Balance.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Facsimilia of RICs
Figure B.1: Facsimile of a RIC initiated by a Legislator from a Coalition Party (2001)
             
      REQUERIMENTO DE INFORMAÇÕES Nº      , DE 2001 
                           (Do Sr. ROLAND LAVIGNE) 
 
 
 
Solicita ao Sr. Ministro do Meio 
Ambiente Informações sobre o 
Desmatamento no Estado da Bahia. 
 
 
 
 
Senhor Presidente, 
 
 
 
Requeiro a Vossa Excelência, com base no art. 50, §2º, da Constituição 
Federal, e nos arts. 115 e 116 do Regimento Interno que, ouvida a Mesa, 
sejam solicitadas informações do Sr. Ministro do Meio Ambiente, sobre o 
desmatamento  no Estado da Bahia. 
 
 
                                            JUSTIFICAÇÃO 
 
Temos informações sobre os inúmeros desmatamentos que vêem ocorrendo  
no Estado da  Bahia, principalmente no Sul, onde a Mata Atlântica está sendo 
devastada com suas árvores derrubadas sem o menor critério por fazendeiros 
inescrupulosos que no afã de grandes lucros com a exploração da madeira,  
causam enormes prejuízos ao meio ambiente.    
 
 
 
Sala da Sessões, em     de              2001 
 
 
ROLAND LAVIGNE 
Dep. Federal PMDB-BA 
103
Figure B.2: Facsimile of a RIC initiated by a Legislator from a Coalition Party (2006)
REQUERIMENTO DE INFORMAÇÃO Nº  DE 2006
(Da Senhora Vanessa Grazziotin)
Solicita  ao  Senhor  Ministro  da 
Educação informações sobre o repasse 
de verbas para a educação indígena. 
Senhor Presidente,
Com fundamento no art. 50 da Constituição Federal e no art. 115, inciso I, 
do Regimento Interno da Câmara dos Deputados, solicito de V. Exa., que seja 
encaminhado ao Ministério da Educação o seguinte pedido de informação:
 Segundo matérias veiculadas nos jornais locais, o Ministério de Educação 
anunciou que investirá cerca de R$ 5 milhões em ações voltadas para a educação 
indígena. Ainda de acordo com a matéria, aproximadamente R$ 2,6 milhões serão 
gastos  com a  construção  de  escolas.  O  restante  da  verba  será  aplicado  em 
cursos de formação inicial e continuada de professores. 
Nesse sentido, solicito a seguinte informação: 
• Especificar  por  Estado  o  repasse  de  verbas,  bem  como
descrevendo a quantia destinada para cada programa;
• No  estado  do  Amazonas,  especificar  o  valor  do  repasse  por
município.
Sala das Sessões,  23 de maio de 2006
Deputada: Vanessa Grazziotin
PCdoB/AM
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B.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics and Variables
Mean St. Dev. Mode Min Max N
Dependent Variable (Aggregated):
Total Number of RICs Per Quarter 57.66 58.38 3 2 326 93
Dependent Variable (by Direction):
Presidential Oversight 9.74 9.93 0 0 52 93
Junior Partners Oversight 47.92 53.58 7 2 296 93
From President’s Party to Junior Partner 4.01 4.26 0 0 24 93
From Junior Partner to President’s Party 26.13 35.04 0 0 239 93
Between Governing Parties
(President’s Party Included) 48.90 55 7 2 320 93
Between Governing Parties
(President’s Party Not Included) 18.76 25 2 0 149 93
Independent Variable:
Ideological Dispersion (Heterogeneity) 4.38 1.42 5.29 0.35 6.13 93
Control Variables:
President’s Approval 39.26 17.24 38 9 83 93
Inflation 4.96 10.64 0.8 -0.17 44.52 93
First Quarter 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 93
105
B.3 Variables’ Distributions
Figure B.3: Variable’s Distributions
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0 100 200 300
Number of RICs Per Quarter
D
en
si
ty
a. Total Number of RICs Per Quarter
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 2 4 6
Ideological Dispersion
D
en
si
ty
b. Ideological Dispersion (Heterogeneity)
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
20 40 60 80
President's Approval Rating
D
en
si
ty
c. President's Approval Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 10 20 30 40
Inflation
D
en
si
ty
d. Inflation
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
−4 −2 0 2 4
Inflation (log)
D
en
si
ty
e. Inflation (Log−Transformed)
106
B.4 Negative Binomial Models
The Poisson model assumes that the mean and variance of the errors are equal. As the
variance of the dependent variable is larger than the mean in the sample, an alternative
model, the negative binomial model, is also conducted. The negative binomial distribution
is a form of the Poisson distribution in which the distribution’s parameter is itself considered
a random variable. The variation of this parameter can account for a variance of the data
that is higher than the mean. The results of the negative binomial model are depicted in
Table B.2 and are consistent with the results found in the study.
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Table B.2: Policy Monitoring: Negative Binomial Models
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Number of RICst−1 0.001 0.142
(0.002) (0.110)
Ideological Dispersion 0.390∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 17.647∗∗ 15.080∗
(Heterogeneity) (0.058) (0.061) (8.640) (8.717)
President’s Approval −0.360 −0.403
(0.476) (0.478)
Inflation (log) −5.385 −5.874
(7.766) (7.802)
First Quarter −9.645 −14.667
(14.329) (14.464)
PSDB −14.404 −14.382
(35.955) (35.963)
PMDB −26.616 −20.180
(37.483) (37.346)
PT −11.796 −8.538
(50.224) (50.484)
Constant 2.233∗∗∗ 2.242∗∗∗ 11.559 16.062
(0.267) (0.262) (32.720) (32.577)
N 93 92 93 92
Log Likelihood −455.282 −450.055 −500.094 −493.252
θ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 914.564 906.110 1,016.187 1,004.503
Notes: Dependent variable: Number of RICs initiated per quarter.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.3: Identifying the Author and the Target: Negative Binomial Models
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Presidential Junior Partners Pres. Party Junior Party Between Partners Between Partners
Oversight Oversight to to (Pres. Party (Pres. Party
Junior Party Pres. Party Included) Not Included)
Number of RICst−1 −0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.003∗ 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ideological Dispersion 0.485∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗
(Heterogeneity) (0.142) (0.131) (0.154) (0.193) (0.130) (0.154)
President’s Approval −0.013∗ −0.007 −0.008 −0.014∗ −0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Inflation (log) 0.080 −0.182 0.082 −0.328∗∗ −0.178 −0.040
(0.120) (0.116) (0.137) (0.133) (0.114) (0.137)
First Quarter −0.085 −0.370∗ −0.472∗ −0.148 −0.407∗ −0.586∗∗
(0.223) (0.217) (0.263) (0.257) (0.215) (0.258)
PMDB 0.014 0.127 −0.180 0.702 0.012 −0.044
(0.609) (0.562) (0.654) (0.827) (0.556) (0.659)
PSDB 1.175∗ 0.300 0.688 2.367∗∗∗ 0.390 0.0002
(0.603) (0.543) (0.661) (0.888) (0.537) (0.640)
PT 1.405∗ −0.076 0.228 1.004 0.005 −0.142
(0.781) (0.750) (0.860) (0.958) (0.741) (0.884)
Constant −0.557 1.981∗∗∗ −0.592 −1.880 1.947∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗
(0.647) (0.513) (0.701) (1.159) (0.509) (0.600)
N 92 92 92 92 92 92
Log Likelihood −283.103 −428.555 −221.696 −357.136 −429.007 −352.234
θ 1.901∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 584.206 875.110 461.393 732.272 876.013 722.468
Notes: Dependent variable: Number of RICs initiated per quarter.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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B.5 Diagnostics for Time Series Data: Distribution, Unit Root Tests, and Au-
tocorrelation Tests
Figure B.4: Policy Monitoring Distribution Over Time
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Table B.4: Unit Root Tests for Overall Oversight
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -4.54 0.01
1 -2.86 0.01
2 -2.14 0.03
3 -1.52 0.1
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.27 0.01
1 -5.03 0.01
2 -4.03 0.01
3 -3.08 0.03
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.62 0.01
1 -5.28 0.01
2 -4.21 0.01
3 -3.09 0.1
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -29.4 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -70.6 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -76.2 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 4.06 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.498 0.04
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.13 0.08
Table B.5: Unit Root Tests for Presidential Oversight
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -4.10 0.01
1 -2.57 0.01
2 -2.28 0.02
3 -1.99 0.04
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -6.37 0.01
1 -4.28 0.01
2 -4.02 0.01
3 -3.78 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -6.84 0.01
1 -4.57 0.01
2 -4.39 0.01
3 -4.16 0.01
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -25.1 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -59.7 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -67.9 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 3.08 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
3 -59.7 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
3 -67.9 0.01
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Table B.6: Unit Root Tests for Junior Partners Oversight
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -4.95 0.01
1 -3.04 0.01
2 -2.29 0.02
3 -1.63 0.09
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.54 0.01
1 -5.05 0.01
2 -4.07 0.01
3 -3.06 0.04
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.80 0.01
1 -5.22 0.01
2 -4.19 0.01
3 -3.04 0.15
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -36 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -75 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -79.3 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 4.13 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.417 0.07
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.123 0.09
Table B.7: Unit Root Tests for Specific Target: From the President’s Party to a Junior
Partner
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -4.88 0.01
1 -3.57 0.01
2 -2.80 0.01
3 -2.39 0.02
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.70 0.01
1 -6.39 0.01
2 -5.55 0.01
3 -5.47 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.65 0.01
1 -6.34 0.01
2 -5.51 0.01
3 -5.42 0.01
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -36.3 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -69.6 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -69.8 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 4.58 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.067 0.1
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.0524 0.1
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Table B.8: Unit Root Tests for Specific Target: From a Junior Partner to the President’s
Party
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -5.55 0.01
1 -3.62 0.01
2 -2.52 0.01
3 -1.74 0.08
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.71 0.01
1 -5.47 0.01
2 -4.05 0.01
3 -2.94 0.05
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.94 0.01
1 -5.66 0.01
2 -4.15 0.01
3 -2.89 0.2
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -45.4 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -75.9 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -79.4 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 3.97 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.412 0.07
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.161 0.04
Table B.9: Unit Root Tests for Between Junior Partners (President’s Party Included)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -4.98 0.01
1 -3.11 0.01
2 -2.29 0.02
3 -1.60 0.1
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.57 0.01
1 -5.15 0.01
2 -4.07 0.01
3 -3.01 0.04
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.85 0.01
1 -5.36 0.01
2 -4.21 0.01
3 -3.00 0.16
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -36.3 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -74.9 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -79.4 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 4.16 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.45 0.06
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.136 0.07
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Table B.10: Unit Root Tests for Between Junior Partners (President’s Party Not Included)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -5.24 0.01
1 -3.09 0.01
2 -2.59 0.01
3 -1.92 0.05
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.20 0.01
1 -4.50 0.01
2 -3.97 0.01
3 -3.06 0.04
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag ADF p-value
0 -7.39 0.01
1 -4.62 0.01
2 -4.08 0.01
3 -3.10 0.12
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -41.3 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -72.2 0.01
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag Z-rho p-value
3 -75.9 0.01
KPSS Test
Type 1: No Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 3.35 0.01
Type 2: With Drift No Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.351 0.09
Type 3: With Drift and Trend
lag stat p-value
2 0.11 0.1
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Figure B.5: Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF)
for Overall Oversight (with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure B.6: ACF and PACF for Presidential Oversight
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure B.7: ACF and PACF for Junior Partners Oversight
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure B.8: ACF and PACF for Specific Target: From the President’s Party to a Junior
Partner (with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure B.9: ACF and PACF for Specific Target: From the Junior Partners to the President’s
Party (with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure B.10: ACF and PACF for Between Coalition Partners (President’s Party Included)
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure B.11: ACF and PACF for Between Coalition Partners (President’s Party Not In-
cluded) (with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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B.6 Comparing AR Models
Table B.11: Comparing AR Models: Policy Monitoring and Ideological Dispersion
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
AR(0) AR(1) AR(4) AR(0) AR(1) AR(4)
Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark w Controls w Controls w Controls
Number of RICst−1 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Number of RICst−4 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Ideological Dispersion 0.360∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(Heterogeneity) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
President’s Approval −0.002 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inflation (log) −0.095∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Honeymoon 0.368∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031)
First Quarter −0.180∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
PSDB 0.495∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.117) (0.116)
PMDB 0.106 0.123 0.167
(0.113) (0.114) (0.116)
PT 0.041 0.086 0.309∗∗
(0.128) (0.131) (0.133)
Constant 2.369∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗ 2.317∗∗∗ 1.619∗∗∗ 1.756∗∗∗ 1.786∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.153) (0.153) (0.149)
N 93 92 89 93 92 89
Log Likelihood −1,915.023 −1,840.606 −1,760.362 −1,707.825 −1,654.142 −1,601.449
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,834.046 3,687.212 3,526.723 3,433.650 3,328.284 3,222.898
Notes: Dependent variable: Number of RICs initiated per quarter.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
118
APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Data Source
Table C.1: Data Source
Variable Source
Duration Amorim Neto, 2006a; CEBRAP, 2015.
Inflation EAP, 2015.
Presidential Approval EAP, 2015.
Unemployment EAP, 2015.
GDP Growth The World Bank, 2014.
Cycle Amorim Neto, 2006a; CEBRAP, 2015.
Size of the Coalition Amorim Neto, 2006a; CEBRAP, 2015.
Ideological Dispersion Amorim Neto, 2006a.
Majority Status Amorim Neto, 2006a; CEBRAP, 2015.
Coalescence Amorim Neto, 2006a
Effective Number of Parties (ENP) Amorim Neto, 2006a; CEBRAP, 2015.
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C.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table C.2: Independent Variables, Summary Statistics and, Expectations
Variable and Summary Statistics Coding Expectation
Inflation: Quarterly percentage change in CPI +
µ = 22.71, σ = 43.46, N = 82
min = −0.58, max = 204.54
Unemployment: Quarterly percentage of the labor force +
µ = 9.29, σ = 3.56, N = 82 without work
min = 3.40, max− 19.82
President’s Approval Rate: Quarterly percentage of presidential -
µ = 43.30, σ = 11.91, N = 72 job approval
min = 14.93, max = 69.60
GDP Growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP -
µ = 2.69, σ = 4.31, N = 82
min = −11.70, max = 11.94
Cycle: Te−TcaTco No
µ = 0.62, σ = 0.31, N = 82 relationship
min = 0, max = 1.5
Size of the Coalition: Number of parties represented in the cabinet +
µ = 3.50, σ = 1.62, N = 82
min = 2, max = 8
Cabinet Coalescence 1−
∑n
i=1(|si−pi|)
2 +
µ = 0.73, σ = 0.05, N = 82
min = 0.61, max = 0.99
Ideological Dispersion: |Pfl − Pfr| +
µ = 0.85, σ = 0.66, N = 82
min = 0, max = 2
Effective Number of Parties (ENP): 1∑n
i=1 s
2
i
+
µ = 5.36, σ = 2.27, N = 82
min = 1.98, max = 9.34
Notes: µ =arithmetic mean, and σ = standard deviation. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of cabinet duration in days. Thus, a negative
sign (-) in the column Expectation refers to a smaller likelihood of cabinet termination—meaning a longer cabinet duration—as the value for the
independent variable increases (keeping all other independent variables constant). A positive sign (+) refers to a greater likelihood of cabinet
termination—a shorter cabinet duration—as the value for the independent variable increases (keeping all other independent variables constant).
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C.3 Correlation Matrices
Table C.3: Correlation Matrix of Variables (not including Presidential Approval Rating;
N = 82)
Variable Duration Inflation Unemployment GDP Cycle Coalition Size
Duration 1 -0.167020554 0.129304483 0.022518059 0.10094269 -0.28183733
Inflation -0.16702055 1 -0.422224931 -0.326982389 0.0604145 0.01195589
Unemployment 0.12930448 -0.422224931 1 0.002938322 0.23432405 -0.08494898
GDP 0.02251806 -0.326982389 0.002938322 1 0.01585105 0.08092697
Cycle 0.10094269 0.060414501 0.234324051 0.015851048 1 -0.02575777
Coalition Size -0.28183733 0.01195589 -0.084948981 0.080926972 -0.02575777 1
Ideo. Disper. -0.08594349 0.1518617 -0.238881967 -0.141759241 0.06367647 0.6246429
ENP -0.48608352 0.217125889 -0.402768468 -0.103795132 -0.01040435 0.5166875
Variable Ideo. Disper. ENP
Duration -0.085943489 -0.48608352
Inflation 0.1518617 0.21712589
Unemployment -0.238881967 -0.40276847
GDP -0.141759241 -0.10379513
Cycle 0.063676466 -0.01040435
Coalition Size 0.624642899 0.5166875
Ideo. Disper. 1 0.35459559
ENP 0.35459559 1
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Table C.4: Correlation Matrix of Variables (including Presidential Approval Rating; N = 72)
Variable Duration Inflation Pres. Approval Unemployment GDP Cycle
Duration 1 -0.151399108 -0.05373539 0.19646092 0.02934272 -0.023492808
Inflation -0.15139911 1 -0.38603803 -0.44626184 -0.31362722 0.02617391
Pres. Approval -0.05373539 -0.386038034 1 -0.13410337 0.33348182 -0.270785766
Unemployment 0.19646092 -0.446261836 -0.13410337 1 -0.01299817 0.304493238
GDP 0.02934272 -0.313627218 0.33348182 -0.01299817 1 0.056372521
Cycle -0.02349281 0.02617391 -0.27078577 0.30449324 0.05637252 1
Coalition Size -0.25115487 -0.006022411 0.38524029 -0.08661672 0.08647316 0.020699096
Ideo. Disper. -0.12297753 0.132179457 0.07529287 -0.20085236 -0.14478612 0.0408607
ENP -0.48056211 0.18324502 0.07772415 -0.42864671 -0.09474026 0.024090485
Variable Coalition Size Ideo. Disper. ENP
Duration -0.251154867 -0.12297753 -0.48056211
Inflation -0.006022411 0.13217946 0.18324502
Pres. Approval 0.385240292 0.07529287 0.07772415
Unemployment -0.086616716 -0.20085236 -0.42864671
GDP 0.086473162 -0.14478612 -0.09474026
Cycle 0.020699096 0.0408607 0.02409048
Coalition Size 1 0.66056968 0.51875963
Ideo. Disper. 0.660569681 1 0.42679171
ENP 0.518759635 0.42679171 1
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C.4 Variables’ Distributions
Figure C.1: Variables’ Distributions
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C.5 OLS Estimated Coefficients
Table C.5: OLS Estimated Coefficients of Economic Indicators, Presidential Approval, and
Control Variables on Cabinet Duration
(OLS 1) (OLS 2) (OLS 3) (OLS 4)
OLS 1 with OLS 2 with
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Inflation (log) −102.205∗∗∗ −100.179∗∗ −88.273∗∗ −69.523
(35.537) (44.094) (36.002) (42.611)
Unemployment −40.727∗∗ −33.706 7.734 19.353
(20.237) (24.514) (25.104) (28.269)
GDP Growth −11.828 −5.353 −3.466 2.338
(11.830) (12.617) (13.477) (14.086)
Presidential Approval −4.195 −3.309
(5.437) (5.277)
Cycle 186.536 −11.191 149.715 −22.371
(159.463) (182.654) (158.374) (175.409)
Size of the Coalition −77.537 −64.065 −138.152∗∗∗ −124.397∗∗
(48.028) (55.641) (47.352) (54.283)
Ideological Dispersion 67.244 85.336 54.339 93.806
(102.901) (114.389) (113.896) (126.727)
Fragmentation (ENP) −83.005∗∗ −81.579∗∗ −94.874∗∗ −78.295∗
(32.920) (37.136) (41.930) (43.412)
Brazil 875.017∗ 833.324∗
(471.442) (471.799)
Chile 1,413.171∗∗ 1,506.948∗∗
(632.748) (640.999)
Uruguay 780.788∗ 807.098∗
(465.967) (468.234)
Constant 2,776.235∗∗∗ 2,841.017∗∗ 1,703.052 1,898.905
(983.326) (1,103.166) (1,207.276) (1,307.392)
N 82 72 82 72
R2 0.410 0.369 0.599 0.587
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.247 0.470 0.426
Residual Std. Error 402.797 (df = 68) 407.394 (df = 57) 356.655 (df = 59) 355.460 (df = 49)
F Statistic 4.730∗∗∗ (df = 10; 68) 3.024∗∗∗ (df = 11; 57) 4.635∗∗∗ (df = 19; 59) 3.661∗∗∗ (df = 19; 49)
Notes: Dependent variable: Cabinet duration (in days). Standard errors in parenthesis: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Two-
tailed test.
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C.6 Cox Model Estimates with Country Fixed-Effects
Table C.6: Cox Model Estimates of Cabinet Duration by Economic Indicators, President’s
Approval Rating, and Control Variables (All Terms Included)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient exp(coeff.) Coefficient exp(coeff.) Coefficient exp(coeff.) Coefficient exp(coeff.)
Inflation (log) 0.208∗∗ 1.231 0.263∗∗ 1.301 0.204∗ 1.227 0.222∗ 1.249
(0.091) (0.119) (0.106) (0.127)
Unemployment 0.096∗ 1.101 0.108∗ 1.114 −0.038 0.963 −0.033 0.967
(0.052) (0.064) (0.081) (0.099)
GDP Growth 0.021 1.021 0.015 1.016 −0.004 0.996 −0.015 0.985
(0.032) (0.033) (0.043) (0.044)
Presidential Approval 0.006 1.006 0.009 1.009
(0.015) (0.018)
Cycle −0.306 0.736 −0.184 0.832 −0.379 0.685 −0.125 0.882
(0.410) (0.456) (0.425) (0.475)
Size of the Coalition 0.111 1.117 0.078 1.081 0.393∗∗ 1.482 0.373∗ 1.452
(0.123) (0.141) (0.162) (0.194)
Ideological Dispersion −0.109 0.896 −0.128 0.880 −0.070 0.933 −0.250 0.778
(0.281) (0.318) (0.417) (0.468)
Fragmentation (ENP) 0.316∗∗∗ 1.371 0.352∗∗∗ 1.422 0.450∗∗∗ 1.568 0.412∗∗ 1.510
(0.106) (0.121) (0.162) (0.164)
Argentina 0.515 1.673 0.209 1.233
(1.896) (1.951)
Bolivia −1.450 0.235
(1.353)
Brazil −2.344∗ 0.096 −2.298 0.101
(1.376) (1.413)
Chile −3.373∗ 0.034 −3.638∗ 0.026
(2.029) (2.135)
Colombia 0.024 1.025 −0.333 0.717
(1.353) (1.444)
Ecuador −0.014 0.986 −0.286 0.751
(1.310) (1.324)
Peru −0.423 0.655 −0.515 0.598
(1.177) (1.186)
Uruguay −1.179 0.308 −1.536 0.215
(1.450) (1.470)
Venezuela −0.923 0.397 −1.314 0.269
(1.718) (1.841)
N 82 72 82 72
R2 0.360 0.367 0.533 0.530
Log Likelihood −251.667 −210.429 −239.188 −200.121
Wald Test 34.230∗∗∗ 30.560∗∗∗ 51.600∗∗∗ 44.280∗∗∗
LR Test 35.248∗∗∗ 31.522∗∗∗ 60.205∗∗∗ 52.139∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 37.429∗∗∗ 34.496∗∗∗ 61.750∗∗∗ 54.677∗∗∗
Notes: Dependent variable: Hazard ratios of cabinet duration = exp(coefficients). Standard errors of the (non-exponentiate) coefficients in
parenthesis: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Two-tailed test. Statistically significant estimates are in bold.
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C.7 Estimated Survival Function
Figure C.2: Estimated Survival Function for the Cox Model of Cabinet Duration
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Note: Having fit a Cox model to the data, this figure depicts the estimated distribution of survival times for
cabinet duration, at the mean values of the independent variables. The broken lines show a point-wise 95
percent confidence intervals around the survival function.
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C.8 Model Diagnostics
Table C.7: Model Diagnostic: Test for the Proportional-Hazards Assumption (Models 1 and
Model 2)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable ρ χ2 p-value ρ χ2 p-value
Inflation (log) -0.0836 0.624 0.4296 -0.0144 0.0177 0.8941
Unemployment -0.1051 0.946 0.3307 -0.0299 0.0706 0.7905
GDP Growth -0.0922 0.805 0.3696 -0.077 0.5002 0.4794
Presidential Approval 0.0342 0.0991 0.7529
Cycle 0.0984 0.839 0.3596 0.0598 0.2805 0.5964
Size of the Coalition 0.1451 2.067 0.1505 0.1014 0.8845 0.347
Ideological Dispersion 0.1071 1.092 0.2959 0.0993 0.8856 0.3467
Cabinet Coalescence -0.0849 0.462 0.4969 -0.0494 0.1456 0.7027
Fragmentation (ENP) -0.2266 6.323 0.0119 -0.1718 3.3747 0.0662
GLOBAL . 14.827 0.1385 . 12.3402 0.3386
Notes: Although there is evidence of non-proportional hazards for “fragmentation (ENP),” the global test is not statistically
significant.
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Table C.8: Model Diagnostic: Test for the Proportional-Hazards Assumption (Models 3 and
Model 4)
Model 3 Model 4
Variable ρ χ2 p-value ρ χ2 p-value
Inflation (log) -0.0902 7.43E-01 0.3886 -0.05167 0.20717 0.649
Unemployment -0.12514 1.92E+00 0.1654 -0.13116 2.16469 0.1412
GDP Growth -0.20619 5.39E+00 0.0203 -0.24999 6.34392 0.0118
Presidential Approval 0.04096 0.18642 0.6659
Cycle 0.11111 9.77E-01 0.3228 0.15872 1.78145 0.182
Size of the Coalition 0.16728 3.90E+00 0.0482 0.17778 4.28377 0.0385
Ideological Dispersion -0.01531 3.49E-02 0.8517 -0.05618 0.40017 0.527
Cabinet Coalescence -0.00155 3.11E-04 0.9859 0.01611 0.02661 0.8704
Fragmentation (ENP) -0.06771 7.17E-01 0.397 -0.08027 0.86213 0.3531
Argentina 0.14544 1.74E+00 0.1872 0.15393 1.86095 0.1725
Bolivia 0.04118 1.41E-01 0.7074 . . .
Brazil -0.05259 2.23E-01 0.637 -0.07523 0.43014 0.5119
Chile -0.07741 6.53E-01 0.4191 -0.11642 1.36587 0.2425
Colombia -0.00247 5.87E-04 0.9807 0.00709 0.00407 0.9491
Ecuador 0.02507 5.35E-02 0.8171 0.01409 0.01431 0.9048
Peru -0.06588 3.66E-01 0.545 -0.07395 0.3919 0.5313
Uruguay 0.02861 7.96E-02 0.7779 0.01198 0.01146 0.9147
Venezuela 0.0413 1.83E-01 0.6686 0.04337 0.21774 0.6408
GLOBAL . 2.07E+01 0.3528 . 20.62666 0.4194
Notes: Although there is evidence of non-proportional hazards for “size of the coalition” and “GDP growth,” the global test is
not statistically significant.
Table C.9: Cox Model Diagnostics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
N 79 69 79 69
R2 0.360 0.367 0.533 0.530
Log Likelihood −251.667 −210.429 −239.188 −200.121
Wald Test 34.230∗∗∗ 30.560∗∗∗ 51.600∗∗∗ 44.280∗∗∗
(on 10 df) (on 11 df) (on 19 df) (on 19 df)
LR Test 35.248∗∗∗ 31.522∗∗∗ 60.205∗∗∗ 52.139∗∗∗
(on 10 df) (on 11 df) (on 19 df) (on 19 df)
Score (Logrank) Test 37.429∗∗∗ 34.496∗∗∗ 61.750∗∗∗ 54.677∗∗∗
(on 10 df) (on 11 df) (on 19 df) (on 19 df)
AIC 523.3346 442.8587 516.3769 438.2422
BIC 547.0291 467.4339 561.3964 480.6902
Note: ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Figure C.3: Model Diagnostics: Influential Observations in Model 1
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Note: Dashed-line at y = 0. This figure depicts the index plots produced by specifying the argument
type = dfbeta to residuals in order to produce a matrix of estimated changes in the regression coefficients
upon deleting each observation in turn (the plots are only for the independent variables with statistically
significant estimates). Comparing the magnitudes of the largest dfbeta values to the regression coefficients
suggests that none of the observations is significantly influential individually.
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Figure C.4: Model Diagnostics: Influential Observations in Model 2
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Note: Dashed-line at y = 0. This figure depicts the index plots produced by specifying the argument
type = dfbeta to residuals in order to produce a matrix of estimated changes in the regression coefficients
upon deleting each observation in turn (the plots are only for the independent variables with statistically
significant estimates). Comparing the magnitudes of the largest dfbeta values to the regression coefficients
suggests that none of the observations is significantly influential individually.
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Figure C.5: Model Diagnostics: Influential Observations in Model 3
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Note: Dashed-line at y = 0. This figure depicts the index plots produced by specifying the argument
type = dfbeta to residuals in order to produce a matrix of estimated changes in the regression coefficients
upon deleting each observation in turn (the plots are only for the independent variables with statistically
significant estimates). Comparing the magnitudes of the largest dfbeta values to the regression coefficients
suggests that none of the observations is significantly influential individually.
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Figure C.6: Model Diagnostics: Influential Observations in Model 4
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Note: Dashed-line at y = 0. This figure depicts the index plots produced by specifying the argument
type = dfbeta to residuals in order to produce a matrix of estimated changes in the regression coefficients
upon deleting each observation in turn (the plots are only for the independent variables with statistically
significant estimates). Comparing the magnitudes of the largest dfbeta values to the regression coefficients
suggests that none of the observations is significantly influential individually.
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C.9 Multiplicative Interaction Models
Table C.10: Cox Model Estimates and Hazard Ratios with Interactive Terms Between Crit-
ical Events and Cycle
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Inflation (log) 0.130 0.250 0.151 0.118
(0.179) (0.214) (0.195) (0.256)
Unemployment 0.099 0.103 −0.043 −0.069
(0.100) (0.112) (0.130) (0.152)
GDP Growth 0.006 −0.021 0.045 −0.009
(0.064) (0.066) (0.085) (0.094)
Presidential Approval 0.043∗ 0.023
(0.024) (0.031)
Cycle −0.482 2.502 −0.397 −3.760
(1.789) (3.362) (1.944) (4.217)
Size of the Coalition 0.072 0.027 0.327∗ 0.258
(0.132) (0.146) (0.173) (0.220)
Coalescence 2.271 2.002 3.272 2.503
(2.232) (2.440) (3.286) (3.521)
Ideological Dispersion −0.214 −0.319 −0.314 −0.309
(0.280) (0.340) (0.414) (0.510)
Fragmentation (ENP) 0.347∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.131) (0.174) (0.180)
Inflation (log) 0.125 −0.018 0.018 0.559
× Cycle (0.273) (0.400) (0.294) (0.493)
Unemployment −0.014 −0.005 0.020 0.261
× Cycle (0.143) (0.188) (0.154) (0.214)
GDP Growth 0.043 0.090 −0.068 0.037
× Cycle (0.113) (0.122) (0.139) (0.150)
Presidential Approval −0.065 −0.001
× Cycle (0.055) (0.049)
N 82 72 82 72
R2 0.339 0.376 0.501 0.525
Log Likelihood −265.527 −221.997 −253.944 −212.174
Wald Test 32.210∗∗∗ 31.920∗∗∗ 49.580∗∗∗ 46.660∗∗∗
LR Test 33.895∗∗∗ 33.963∗∗∗ 57.061∗∗∗ 53.609∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test 35.654∗∗∗ 36.641∗∗∗ 59.624∗∗∗ 58.077∗∗∗
Notes: Dependent variable: Cabinet duration in days. Standard errors in parenthesis: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Two-tailed
test.
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Table C.11: Cox Model Estimates and Hazard Ratios with Interactive Terms Between Eco-
nomic Indicators and Presidential Approval
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Inflation (log) −0.114 −0.309
(0.521) (0.595)
Unemployment 0.224 0.189
(0.244) (0.265)
GDP Growth −0.071 −0.283∗∗
(0.124) (0.132)
Presidential Approval 0.007 0.004
(0.074) (0.077)
Cycle −0.293 −0.219
(0.478) (0.491)
Size of the Coalition 0.104 0.442∗∗
(0.146) (0.195)
Coalescence 4.206 6.188
(2.585) (5.355)
Ideological Dispersion −0.211 −0.549
(0.309) (0.487)
MajStatus −0.073 0.326
(0.365) (0.475)
Fragmentation (ENP) 0.385∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.169)
Inflation 0.009 0.015
× Presidential Approval (0.012) (0.013)
Unemployment −0.004 −0.005
× Presidential Approval (0.005) (0.006)
GDP Growth 0.003 0.007
× Presidential Approval (0.003) (0.006)
N 72 72
R2 0.377 0.582
Log Likelihood −221.925 −207.552
Wald Test 30.380∗∗∗ (df = 14) 47.930∗∗∗ (df = 23)
LR Test 34.107∗∗∗ (df = 14) 62.852∗∗∗ (df = 23)
Score (Logrank) Test 34.512∗∗∗ (df = 14) 61.553∗∗∗ (df = 23)
Notes: Dependent variable: Cabinet duration in days. Standard errors in parenthesis: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Two-tailed
test.
134
